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ORIGINALISM AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 
Lawrence B. Solum* 
 
Constitutional interpretation is the activity that discovers the 
communicative content or linguistic meaning of the constitutional text.  
Constitutional construction is the activity that determines the legal effect 
given the text, including doctrines of constitutional law and decisions of 
constitutional cases or issues by judges and other officials.  The 
interpretation-construction distinction, frequently invoked by contemporary 
constitutional theorists and rooted in American legal theory in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, marks the difference between these two 
activities. 
This Article advances two central claims about constitutional 
construction.  First, constitutional construction is ubiquitous in 
constitutional practice.  The central warrant for this claim is conceptual:  
because construction is the determination of legal effect, construction 
always occurs when the constitutional text is applied to a particular legal 
case or official decision.  Although some constitutional theorists may prefer 
to use different terminology to mark the distinction between interpretation 
and construction, every constitutional theorist should embrace the 
distinction itself, and hence should agree that construction in the stipulated 
sense is ubiquitous.  Construction occurs in every constitutional case. 
The second claim is more substantive and practical. In some cases, 
construction can simply translate the plain meaning of the constitutional 
text into corresponding doctrines of constitutional law—we might call this 
strict construction.  But in other cases, the constitutional text does not 
provide determinate answers to constitutional questions. For example, the 
text may be vague or irreducibly ambiguous.  We can call this domain of 
constitutional underdeterminacy the construction zone.  The second claim is 
that the construction zone is ineliminable: the actual text of the U.S. 
Constitution contains general, abstract, and vague provisions that require 
constitutional construction that goes beyond the meaning of the text for 
their application to concrete constitutional cases.   
 
*  John Carroll Research Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.  I owe 
thanks for comments, criticisms, and suggestions to Randy Barnett, Mitchell Berman, 
Andrew Coan, Thomas Colby, Richard Garnett, Stephen Griffin, Gary Lawson, John 
McGinnis, Michael Paulsen, Michael Rappaport, Martin Redish, Lori Ringhand, Peter 
Smith, and the participants at The New Originalism in Constitutional Law Symposium held 
at Fordham University School of Law. 
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“‘Interpretation’ will be used here in this modern sense to refer to the 
process by which courts determine the ‘meaning’ of the language.  We are 
not concerned with overriding legal rules which may render contract 
language ineffective after it has been interpreted.  Nor are we concerned 
with ‘gap filling’ by which the absence of contract language is remedied. 
Our concern is exclusively with contract language and its ‘meaning.’”1 
“In contrast, construction of the contract is the determination of the 
contract’s ‘legal operation—its effect upon the action of courts and 
administrative officials.’”2 
E. Allan Farnsworth, “Meaning” in the Law of Contracts 
INTRODUCTION 
Writing in 1967, Allan Farnsworth was invoking a then-familiar 
distinction between contract interpretation and construction, but the idea is 
more general than that.  Both courts and legal theorists mark a general 
distinction between “interpretation” (discovering meaning3) and 
 
 1. E. Allan Farnsworth, “Meaning” in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 940 
(1967). 
 2. Id. at 939. 
 3. Interpretation seeks “meaning” in the linguistic sense; meaning in this sense can 
most precisely be called “communicative content.”  The word “meaning” has other senses, 
including “legal meaning,” which refers to legal content.  Moreover it is a separate question 
whether the communicative content of the Constitution is the “original meaning.”  Because 
this Article is about the relationship between originalism and constitutional construction, it 
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“construction” (determining legal effect).  Recently, the concept of 
constitutional construction has come to play an important role in 
contemporary originalist constitutional theory4 and elsewhere.5  The notion 
of constitutional construction has been especially prominent in recent 
theorizing about constitutional originalism. 
Originalism6 is a family of constitutional theories united by two core 
ideas.  The first of these ideas (the “Fixation Thesis”) is that the original 
meaning (“communicative content”) of the constitutional text is fixed at the 
time each provision is framed and ratified.  The second idea (the 
“Constraint Principle”) is that constitutional actors (e.g. judges, officials, 
and citizens) ought to be constrained by the original meaning when they 
engage in constitutional practice (paradigmatically, deciding constitutional 
cases, but also including constitutional decisionmaking outside the courts 
by officials and citizens).7 
The originalist family converges on these two core ideas, but particular 
versions of originalism differ in many other respects.  For example, some 
originalists focus on the original public meaning of the text, while others 
believe that original meaning is determined by the original intentions of the 
Framers or the original methods of constitutional interpretation.8  The 
 
(mostly) assumes an originalist account of the communicative content of the Constitution, 
but a defense of that assumption is a separate topic.  I owe thanks to Lori Ringhand for 
suggesting these clarifications. 
 4. This Article builds on prior work exploring the distinction. See Lawrence B. Solum, 
The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2011).  For the role 
of the distinction in contemporary originalism, see infra Part I.A.2.  For examples of the 
distinction’s use by courts and commentators, see infra text accompanying notes 116–25.  
For a short introduction to the distinction, see Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and 
Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65 (2011). 
 5. Tun-Jen Chiang & Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction 
in Patent Law, 123 YALE L.J. (forthcoming December 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2234193. 
 6. In this Article, I will use the word “originalism” to refer to theories that endorse 
fixation and constraint.  “Nonoriginalist” shall be used to refer to theories that deny one or 
both of the two theses.  “Nonoriginalism” will be distinguished from “living 
constitutionalism,” which shall be used to identify theories that endorse the proposition that 
the legal content of constitutional doctrine changes over time. 
  There are at least two distinctive forms of nonoriginalism:  “Interpretive 
Nonoriginalism” is the view that the communicative content of the constitutional text 
changes over time:  someone who held the view that the constitution should be interpreted in 
light of the contemporary plain meaning of the text would be an Interpretive Nonoriginalist.  
“Constructive Nonoriginalism” is the view that legal content of constitutional doctrine does 
not constrain (but may contribute to) the legal content of constitutional doctrine. 
 7. This view that originalism is a family of theories organized around the Fixation 
Thesis and the Constraint Principle is widely accepted. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, 
Originalism, Abortion, and the Thirteenth Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1917, 1918 n.2 
(2012); see also Jack M. Balkin & David A. Strauss, Response and Colloquy Concerning the 
Papers by Jack Balkin and David Strauss, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1271 (2012); Thomas B. 
Colby, Originalism and the Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 1 n.1); Lee J. Strang, An Originalist Theory of Precedent:  
The Privileged Place of Originalist Precedent, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1729, 1729 n.1.  The 
core of originalism, the Fixation Thesis, and the Constraint Principle are discussed in greater 
depth below. See infra Part I.A.1. 
 8. See infra Part II.A.2. 
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phrase “the New Originalism” could be used in a variety of ways,9 but in 
this Article it will be used to refer to originalist theories that adhere to the 
core originalist ideas (fixation and constraint) and two additional notions:  
(1) the claim that original meaning is a function of the public meaning of 
the constitutional text, and (2) recognition of a distinction between 
interpretation and construction. 
The interpretation-construction distinction’s role in the New Originalism 
is the focus of this Article.  More will be said about the nature of the 
distinction below,10 but for now we can mark the difference between 
interpretation and construction as follows: 
 “Constitutional interpretation” is the activity that discerns the 
communicative content (linguistic meaning) of the constitutional text. 
 “Constitutional construction” is the activity that determines the content 
of constitutional doctrine and the legal effect of the constitutional text. 
Thus, the interpretation-construction distinction marks the difference 
between (1) inquiries into meaning of the constitutional text and (2) the 
process of deciding which doctrines of constitutional law and what 
decisions of constitutional cases are associated with (or required by) that 
meaning. 
This Article advances two central claims about constitutional 
construction.  The first claim is that constitutional construction is ubiquitous 
in constitutional practice.  The central warrant for this claim is conceptual:  
because construction is the determination of legal effect, construction 
always occurs when the constitutional text is applied to a particular legal 
case or official decision.  Although some constitutional theorists may prefer 
to use different terminology to mark the distinction between interpretation 
and construction, every constitutional theorist should embrace the 
distinction itself,11 and hence should agree that construction in the 
stipulated sense is ubiquitous. 
 
 9. The phrase, “the New Originalism,” seems to have been popularized by Keith 
Whittington. See Keith Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599 
(2004).  The history of the phrase is recounted below. See infra note 53. 
  Numerous other scholars have used the phrase the New Originalism. See Matthew D. 
Bunker, Originalism 2.0 Meets the First Amendment:  The “New Originalism,” Interpretive 
Methodology, and Freedom of Expression, 17 COMM. L. & POL’Y 329 (2012); Thomas B. 
Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713 (2011); Martin H. Redish & 
Matthew B. Arnould, Judicial Review, Constitutional Interpretation, and the Democratic 
Dilemma:  Proposing a “Controlled Activism” Alternative, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1485, 1507 
(2012) (characterizing New Originalism as embracing constitutional construction); Lawrence 
Rosenthal, The New Originalism Meets the Fourteenth Amendment:  Original Public 
Meaning and the Problem of Incorporation, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 361 (2009); Mark 
Tushnet, Heller and the New Originalism, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 609 (2008); Daniel Hornal, Why 
the Demands of Formalism Will Prevent New Originalism from Furthering Conservative 
Political Goals, CRIT:  CRITICAL LEGAL STUD. J. (Summer 2012), http://thecritui.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/spring2/Hornal_Final2.pdf. 
 10. See infra Part I.A.2. 
 11. See infra Part III. 
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The second claim is more substantive and practical.  In some cases, 
construction can simply translate the plain meaning of the constitutional 
text into corresponding doctrines of constitutional law—we might call this 
“strict construction.”12  But in other cases, the constitutional text does not 
provide determinate answers to constitutional questions.  For example, the 
text may be vague or irreducibly ambiguous.  We can call this domain of 
constitutional underdeterminacy “the construction zone.”  The second claim 
is that the construction zone is ineliminable:  the actual text of the U.S. 
Constitution contains general, abstract, and vague provisions that require 
constitutional construction for their application to concrete constitutional 
cases.  The second claim is (and should be) more controversial than the 
first; objections to the existence of the construction zone are considered and 
answered in this Article.13 
Part I of this Article situates the idea of constitutional construction in the 
context of contemporary debates about originalism and among originalists.  
Part II argues that the interpretation-construction distinction provides 
conceptual clarity and answers a variety of objections to the distinction 
itself and the use of the terms “interpretation” and “construction” to express 
the distinction.  Part III advances the claim that construction is ubiquitous; 
Part IV makes the case for the ineliminability of the construction zone.  Part 
V discusses the relationship between constitutional construction and 
debates about originalism and living constitutionalism.  A conclusion 
follows. 
I.  SITUATING CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 
We can begin our examination of the idea of constitutional construction 
by examining the larger theoretical context in which this idea is situated.  
Let us start by situating originalism in the larger context of constitutional 
theory. 
A.  Originalisms:  Old and New 
Constitutional theory investigates the general and abstract questions at 
the foundations of constitutional law, addressing a variety of questions.  
Some of these questions are directly connected to political theory and 
philosophy, including questions about the democratic legitimacy of 
constitutional regimes, questions about liberty and equality, and questions 
about sovereignty and the nature of the state.  Other questions are 
institutional, including questions about separation of powers and federalism 
and the institutional design of the various branches of government.  The 
focus of originalism is on questions about constitutional interpretation and 
 
 12. The idea of translation invoked here is predicated on a distinction between 
“communicative content” and “legal content.”  The communicative content of the 
constitutional text can be translated into corresponding legal content of constitutional 
doctrine. See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2013). 
 13. See infra Part IV. 
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construction.  Originalism answers questions like:  “How do we discover 
the meaning of the constitutional text?” and, “How should the meaning of 
the text affect constitutional practice?” 
 The word “originalism” appears to have been coined by Paul Brest in an 
article entitled The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding.14  
Brest stipulated the following definition:   
By “originalism” I mean the familiar approach to constitutional 
adjudication that accords binding authority to the text of the Constitution 
or the intentions of its adopters.15 
Contemporary originalism is actually a family of constitutional theories, 
and there may be some disagreement at the margins as to whether a 
particular theory is properly called “originalist.”  But more than thirty years 
after Brest coined the word in 1980, it is possible to identify a core set of 
ideas that are shared by almost all contemporary originalist thinkers. 
1.  The Core of Originalism:  Fixation and Constraint 
Two ideas define the core of contemporary originalism.  The first idea is 
a claim about constitutional interpretation—roughly, that the linguistic 
meaning of the constitutional text is fixed for each provision at the time that 
provision was framed and ratified.  In other words, the communicative 
content of the text is determined at the time of its origin—hence, the term 
“originalism.” 
We can call this first claim the “Fixation Thesis.”  So long as we 
formulate the Fixation Thesis at the right level of generality and abstraction, 
almost every originalist can and should endorse it.  Originalists agree that 
meaning is fixed when the text is written and adopted, but they may 
disagree about the precise mechanism by which fixation occurs.  “Public 
Meaning Originalism” names the version of originalist theory holding that 
the communicative content of the constitutional text is fixed at the time of 
origin by the conventional semantic meaning of the words and phrases in 
the context that was shared by the drafters, ratifiers, and citizens.  “Original 
Intentions Originalism” is the view that the intentions of the Framers do the 
work of fixation.  “Original Methods Originalism” names the theory that 
holds that the methods of legal interpretation that prevailed at the time the 
text was written fixes original meaning.  But all of these members of the 
originalist family agree on a core idea—meaning is fixed at the time of 
origin.16 
 
 14. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. 
REV. 204 (1980) [hereinafter Brest, The Misconceived Quest].  Brest reports that he believes 
he coined the term. E-mail from Paul Brest, Professor Emeritus, Stanford Law School, to 
author (Dec. 2, 2009, 6:01 PM) (on file with author). 
 15. Brest, The Misconceived Quest, supra note 14, at 204. 
 16. In this Article, we are investigating originalism from the inside, and I simply assume 
(rather than argue for) the Fixation Thesis.  For a defense of the thesis, see Lawrence B. 
Solum, Should We Be Originalists?, in ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, 
CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM 36–63 (2011).  Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner express the 
Fixation Thesis as a semantic canon of construction applicable to legal texts in general. See 
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Originalists agree on a second idea that we can formulate as a principle 
that guides constitutional practice.  The principle addresses the relationship 
between the meaning of the text and its legal effect.  Originalists converge 
on what we can call the “Constraint Principle”:  constitutional construction 
should be constrained by the original meaning of the constitutional text.17 
The originalist position on this relationship is illuminated by comparison 
with nonoriginalist18 views.19  Almost all constitutional theorists agree that 
the meaning of the text should make some contribution20 to constitutional 
law and practice.  For example, Philip Bobbitt has articulated an influential 
theory of constitutional interpretation and construction that identifies 
multiple modalities of constitutional argument,21 including text, history, 
structure, precedent, “ethos” of the American social order, and prudence.22  
Stephen Griffin calls a variation of this view “pluralism.”23  A pluralist 
might agree that the linguistic meaning of the text (sometimes) contributes 
to the legal content of constitutional doctrine, but deny that the text controls 
or constrains constitutional practice.24 
Originalists agree with living constitutionalists like Bobbitt and Griffin 
that the communicative content of the constitutional text contributes to the 
content of constitutional doctrine, but characteristically, they contend that 
“pluralism” does not adequately describe the relationship between the 
meaning of the text and other factors.  Pluralists believe that the text 
operates at the same level as other methods of constitutional construction.  
 
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW:  THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL 
TEXTS 78 (2012) (formulating the “Fixed-Meaning Canon” as, “Words must be given the 
meaning they had when the text was adopted”). 
 17. For a defense of the Constraint Principle, see Solum, supra note 16.  Within the 
originalist family of theories, the Constraint Principle is justified in different ways.  For 
example, it could be argued that constraint is required by popular sovereignty (democratic 
legitimacy), by the nature of the constitution as a written text, by rule-of-law concerns, or by 
institutional concerns about discretionary power of unelected judges.  It can also be argued 
that constraint is required by legal norms—although this leaves open the possibility that the 
legal norms should be changed. See generally id. 
 18. See supra note 6 (defining originalism and nonoriginalism). 
 19. See infra Table 1 (differentiating originalism and nonoriginalism). 
 20. “Contribution” names a more general class of relationships between the 
communicative content of the text and the legal content of constitutional doctrine than does 
“constraint.”  The text contributes to doctrine so long as it makes some difference.  The text 
constrains doctrine only if it sets limits on what doctrine is valid—possibly subject to limited 
defeasibility conditions. See generally THE LOGIC OF LEGAL REQUIREMENTS:  ESSAYS ON 
DEFEASIBILITY (Jordi Ferrer Beltran & Giovanni Battista Ratti eds., 2012) (collecting essays 
that discuss the idea of defeasibility in law). 
 21. The idea that law is a complex argumentative practice is developed by Dennis 
Patterson. See DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH 128–50 (1996). 
 22. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12–13 (1991). 
 23. Stephen M. Griffin, Pluralism in Constitutional Interpretation, 72 TEX. L. REV. 
1753, 1753 (1994) (“Pluralistic theories of constitutional interpretation hold that there are 
multiple legitimate methods of interpreting the Constitution.”); see also Richard H. Fallon, 
Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 
1189, 1244–46, 1252–58 (1987) (discussing forms of constitutional argument including text, 
historical intent, theory, precedent, and value). 
 24. Bobbitt’s modalities and Griffin’s pluralism are discussed in more detail below. See 
infra notes 91–98 and accompanying text. 
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Originalists typically believe that the text operates as a constraint on other 
methods.  At a minimum, constraint requires consistency—at least absent 
the presence of unusual and carefully cabined defeasibility conditions.25  
The Constraint Principle requires that the content of constitutional doctrine 
and the resolution of constitutional cases be consistent with the original 
meaning of the text. 
Many originalists go beyond consistency.  For example, some originalists 
may believe that all the rules of constitutional doctrine must be derived 
from either a specific provision or structural feature of the constitutional 
text.  We might formulate this idea by distinguishing between constitutional 
constructions that are bound to the text and those that float free of both 
particular clauses and the constitutional structure.  Let us use the terms 
“text-bound” and “text-free” to distinguish these two sorts of constitutional 
doctrines.26 
Some originalists may object to so-called “unenumerated constitutional 
rights” on the ground that they are text free.  Other originalists might 
defend such rights but only to the extent that they are bound to the 
constitutional text—for example, such rights might be bound to the Ninth 
Amendment or the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  And it is possible that there are originalists who would defend 
unenumerated rights on the basis that they are presupposed by the 
Constitution even though they cannot be bound to any particular clause or 
to some structural feature of the text.  This final group of originalists might 
require consistency but not textual binding.  They would allow for text-free 
constitutional doctrines, so long as the content of these doctrines is 
consistent with the text. 
Finally, some originalists may believe in a principle of constitutional 
construction that limits judicially enforceable constitutional doctrine to 
those rules that are directly supported by the clear meaning of the 
constitutional text.  Their version of the Constraint Principle would require 
courts to defer to the political branches if the outcome of a case was not 
required by the clear meaning of text; if the best interpretation of the text 
results in vagueness or irreducible ambiguity, then the courts should follow 
a constitutional default rule, for example, a rule that would require courts to 
abstain from interfering with legislative or executive action. 
So originalists agree on the Constraint Principle in the abstract, but they 
may disagree about the particular form that the Constraint Principle should 
take.  Nonetheless, almost all originalists are likely to agree on the 
requirement of consistency.  Together, the Fixation Thesis and the 
Constraint Principle form the core of originalism.  In this Article, I stipulate 
 
 25. See generally THE LOGIC OF LEGAL REQUIREMENTS:  ESSAYS ON DEFEASIBILITY, 
supra note 20. 
 26. See Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and the Unwritten Constitution, 2013 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 1935, 1950–53.  Requiring that all doctrines of constitutional law be textually bound 
might entail that are no constitutional backdrops.  The idea of a constitutional backdrop is 
usefully explored in Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1813 (2012). 
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that any theory that endorses these two principles shall be called 
“originalism,” and that any theory that rejects either or both of the two 
principles will be labeled as “nonoriginalism.”27 
2.  Variation and Convergence:  What Determines Original Meaning? 
A comprehensive history of originalist theorizing has yet to be written.28  
Originalist ideas are found in U.S. Supreme Court cases that predate 
contemporary debates and the word “originalism.”  One famous example is 
Justice George Sutherland’s dissent in Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. 
Blaisdell29: 
A provision of the Constitution, it is hardly necessary to say, does not 
admit of two distinctly opposite interpretations.  It does not mean one 
thing at one time and an entirely different thing at another time.  If the 
contract impairment clause, when framed and adopted, meant that the 
terms of a contract for the payment of money could not be altered in 
invitum by a state statute enacted for the relief of hardly pressed debtors to 
the end and with the effect of postponing payment or enforcement during 
and because of an economic or financial emergency, it is but to state the 
obvious to say that it means the same now.30 
The conventional story about the contemporary emergence of originalism 
sometimes begins with writings by Robert Bork,31 then–Associate Justice 
William Rehnquist,32 and Raoul Berger33 in the 1970s.  Originalism rose to 
prominence in part because of a speech before the American Bar 
Association delivered in 1985 by then–Attorney General Edwin Meese 
III.34  In this early phase, there was substantial emphasis on the original 
intentions of the Framers; Meese spoke of a “jurisprudence of original 
intention.”35  We can call these early versions of originalism “Proto-
Originalism.”36  One characteristic of Proto-Originalism is that it was only 
 
 27. See supra note 6 (defining originalism and nonoriginalism). 
 28. See generally Lorianne Updike Toler, J. Carl Cecere & Don Willett, Pre-
’Originalism’, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 277 (2012) (discussing the history of original 
methods in the courts).  An influential account of the history of contemporary originalism is 
provided in Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the 
Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113 (2003). 
 29. 290 U.S. 398, 448–49 (1934) (Sutherland, J., dissenting). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. 
L.J. 1 (1971). 
 32. William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693 
(1976). 
 33. RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977). 
 34. See Edwin Meese III, U.S. Attorney Gen., Speech Before the American Bar 
Association (July 9, 1985), in THE GREAT DEBATE:  INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN 
CONSTITUTION 1, 1 (Paul G. Cassel ed., 1986); see also Lynette Clemetson, Meese’s 
Influence Looms in Today’s Judicial Wars, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2005, at A1; Edwin Meese 
III, The Case for Originalism, HERITAGE FOUND. (June 6, 2005), http://www.heritage.org/
research/commentary/2005/06/the-case-for-originalism. 
 35. Edwin Meese III, The Supreme Court of the United States:  Bulwark of a Limited 
Constitution, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 455, 465–66 (1986). 
 36. See generally Toler et al., supra note 28 (discussing Pre-Originalism). 
2013]  CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 463 
partially theorized.  Bork, Rehnquist, and Berger discuss original intentions, 
but they do not have a theory of original meaning or of the precise role it 
should play in constitutional practice. 
Proto-Originalism was criticized by Brest37 and others.38  One key 
objection focused on the nature of intentions.  If one believed that intentions 
are mental states of individuals, then determining the original intention of 
the Framers may be problematic.  Different Framers may have had different 
intentions with respect to the same provision; some Framers may not have 
had any clear intention at all.  This criticism of originalism prompted a 
variety of responses.  Some originalists defended intentionalism; Richard 
Kay is a notable example.39  But many originalists turned in a different 
direction.  An important event occurred in 1986, when Justice Antonin 
Scalia made an address that urged originalists to “change the label from the 
Doctrine of Original Intent to the Doctrine of Original Meaning.”40  The 
version of originalism that we now call “original public meaning 
originalism” seems to have entered academic debates via the work of Gary 
Lawson,41 and appeals to original public meaning also made early 
appearances in the work of Steven Calabresi and Saikrishna Prakash.42  
Randy Barnett elaborated on their views in his well-known article, An 
Originalism for Nonoriginalists.43 
On the surface, it might appear that the split between original intentions 
and original public meaning presaged serious fragmentation of the 
originalism family of constitutional theories.  Other constitutional scholars 
wrote of the “original understanding of the ratifiers.”44  Recently, John 
McGinnis and Michael Rappaport have argued for “original methods 
 
 37. See Brest, The Misconceived Quest, supra note 14. 
 38. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 470 
(1981); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. 
REV. 885 (1985). 
 39. Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication:  
Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226 (1988). 
 40. Antonin Scalia, U.S. Supreme Court Justice, Address by Justice Antonin Scalia 
Before the Attorney General’s Conference on Economic Liberties in Washington, D.C. (June 
14, 1986), in U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL POL’Y, ORIGINAL MEANING 
JURISPRUDENCE:  A SOURCEBOOK app. C at 101, 106 (1987). 
 41. See Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 875 (1992). 
 42. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power To Execute 
the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 553 (1994). 
 43. Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 5 LOY. L. REV. 611 (1999). 
 44. See Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 375 
n.130 (1981) (“Although the intention of the ratifiers, not the Framers, is in principle 
decisive, the difficulties of ascertaining the intent of the ratifiers leaves little choice but to 
accept the intent of the Framers as a fair reflection of it.”); John C. Yoo, The Judicial 
Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1374 (1997) (“To the extent that history 
matters, it is the original understanding of the ratifiers that we should seek to enforce.”); see 
also Kurt T. Lash, Of Inkblots and Originalism:  Historical Ambiguity and the Case of the 
Ninth Amendment, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 467, 467–68 (2008) (“Today the more 
sophisticated forms of originalism seek the meaning of the text as it was likely understood 
by those who added the provision to the Constitution.”). 
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originalism”—which emphasizes the methods of legal interpretation that 
prevailed at the time the text was written.45 
These variations within originalism have prompted Thomas Colby and 
Peter Smith to argue that “originalism is not a single, coherent, unified 
theory of constitutional interpretation, but is rather a disparate collection of 
distinct constitutional theories that share little more than a misleading 
reliance on a common label.”46  We have already seen that this charge does 
not accurately reflect the current state of play among theorists who self-
identify as originalists; almost all such theorists converge on the Fixation 
Thesis and the Constraint Principle—although they may not use these 
particular phrases.  Fixation and constraint provide a core content to 
originalism that meaningfully distinguishes originalism from rival theories; 
hence, the charge of “misleading reliance on a common label” is 
demonstrably false.  But even if this charge were true, it would not be a 
substantive objection to the best theory labeled as originalist or, for that 
matter, to any version of originalism. 
Although originalists do not agree all the way down, the originalist 
disagreement about the role of Framers’ intentions versus ratifiers’ 
understandings versus public meaning versus original methods should not 
obscure substantial agreement among originalists at a more practical level.  
Under normal circumstances, the intentions of the Framers will be reflected 
in the public meaning of the constitutional text:  as competent speakers and 
writers of the natural language English, the Framers are likely to have 
understood that the best way to convey their intentions would be to state 
them clearly in language that would be grasped by the officials and citizens 
to whom the constitutional text was addressed.  For the same reason, the 
original understandings of the ratifiers are likely to converge with both 
public meaning and original intentions.  Similarly, the original methods of 
constitutional interpretation are likely to give pride of place to public 
meaning, although we will not investigate the evidence for that conclusion 
on this occasion.  So as a practical matter, originalists are likely to agree on 
midlevel principles of constitutional interpretation even if they disagree 
about the theoretical grounds upon which those principles rest. 
There is one more topic that may divide originalists.  The meaning of the 
constitutional text is, in part, a function of the conventional semantic 
meanings of the words and phrases as combined by syntax and grammar.  
This aspect of meaning is sometimes called “literal meaning”—the meaning 
that we get from the words alone (without reference to context).  Using a 
slightly different vocabulary, we can call this aspect of meaning “semantic 
content.”  But the meaning of the text is also a function of the context of 
constitutional communication.  This stems from a very general fact about 
 
 45. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism:  A New 
Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 751 
(2009). 
 46. Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 239 
(2009). But see, Colby, supra note 7 (manuscript at 1 n.1) (accepting fixation and constraint 
as ideas upon which all or almost all originalists agree). 
2013]  CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 465 
linguistic communication.  Much of the work of communication is done by 
context.  We make a plan to have lunch on Monday; when the day comes 
around, I send you a short email:  “Let’s meet at Wise Guys at noon.”  You 
understand the email to communicate many things that are not explicitly 
said.  You take it that I mean “noon, today” and not any other day.  You 
understand that I mean what could be explicitly said as “meet for lunch” 
and not for some other purpose.  This additional content is not stated 
explicitly, but is nonetheless communicated because you know that the 
email was composed in the context of our previous plan and that Wise Guys 
is a restaurant that serves pizza and is open for lunch.  We can call the 
contribution that context makes to communicative content “contextual 
enrichment.”47 
Contextual enrichment is pervasive in constitutional communication.  
Consider for example the Appointments Clause.  Here is the full text of the 
clause: 
[The President] shall nominate, and, by and with the Advice and Consent 
of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United 
States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and 
which shall be established by Law:  but the Congress may by Law vest 
the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the 
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.48 
 
 47. By “contextual enrichment,” I mean to refer to the same phenomena that are 
sometimes called “pragmatic enrichment” in the philosophy of language. See generally 
François Recanti, Pragmatic Enrichment, in ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF 
LANGUAGE 67 (Gillian Russell & Delia Graff Fera eds., 2012).  For the purposes of legal 
theory (and especially constitutional theory), the phrase “pragmatic enrichment” would not 
communicate well.  The distinction between pragmatics and semantics is unfamiliar to most 
academic lawyers, and the word “pragmatic” is associated with legal pragmatism. See, e.g., 
Richard A. Posner, Legal Pragmatism Defended, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 683 (2004).  For a 
valuable discussion of the role of communicative enrichment, see generally Hrafn 
Asgeirsson, Textualism, Pragmatic Enrichment, and Objective Communicative Content 
(Monash Univ. Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2012/21, 2012), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2142266. 
  Because communicative content includes both semantic content and the contextual 
enrichment of that content, criticisms of the interpretation-construction distinction that align 
context with construction are misplaced if directed against the account of the distinction 
developed here. See Jessie Hill, Resistance to Constitutional Theory:  The Supreme Court, 
Constitutional Change, and the “Pragmatic Moment,” 91 TEX. L. REV. 1815, 1831–32 
(2013).  Hill argues, “Choices always must be made among possible meanings, as meaning 
does not exist without context.  All interpretation is also construction.” Id. at 1832.  To the 
extent that Hill refers to the contribution that context makes to communicative content, the 
substance of her point is correct, but her understanding of “construction” is then identical 
with the understanding of “interpretation” advanced here.  If by “context” she means to refer 
to normative considerations, then her point is not correct, because it is possible to discern 
linguistic meaning without giving a text legal effect.  Of course, when judges decide cases 
on the basis of a constitutional provision, they also give that provision legal effect and 
therefore, consider “context”—if context simply means normative considerations of some 
kind. See infra Part I.C (discussing the role of normative considerations in construction). 
 48. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
466 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
The text does not specify that the “Heads of Departments” in question must 
be the heads of departments of the national government (such as the State 
Department) nor that the “Courts of Law” must be Article III courts, but 
these scope limitations may be implied from the context of utterance; this 
conclusion is so obvious and sensible that it is extraordinarily unlikely that 
Congress would ever consider vesting an appointment in the head of a 
department of a business or foreign nation, or in the “Courts of Law” of 
Canada. 
Likewise, the Ninth Amendment says, “The enumeration in the 
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage 
others retained by the people.”49  The literal meaning of the text forbids a 
construction (e.g., from enumeration we can infer the list of enumerated 
rights is exclusive), but nonetheless the text (read contextually) suggests 
that the people do in fact retain other rights.50 
Contextual enrichment is a complex topic, and these remarks are merely 
suggestive.  One feature of contextual enrichment bears special emphasis, 
however.  Contextual enrichment can be cancelled by explicit statement.  
So if the Appointments Clause contained an addendum, “The courts of law 
shall include all courts and shall not be limited to the courts established 
under this Constitution,” the addendum would cancel the implied scope 
limitation.  Many of the canons of interpretation work this way:  for 
example, Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner identify a “presumption against 
retroactivity” that operates with respect to statutes, but the presumption is 
rebutted if the semantic content of the statute is explicitly retroactive.51 
Originalists are likely to agree that the meaning of the Constitution is at 
least partially determined by contextual enrichment, but it is possible that 
they will disagree about the precise role that contextual enrichment plays.  
For example, public meaning originalists may believe that the relevant 
context must be accessible to the public at the time each constitutional 
provision is proposed for ratification:  we might call this “the publicly 
available context of constitutional communication.”  But original intentions 
originalists might believe that the relevant context (for determining 
communicative content) includes everything that is part of the authorial 
process (the Framing); in the case of the original Constitution, this would 
include various events that occurred at the Philadelphia Convention.  Public 
meaning originalists would not accept the events of the convention as part 
of the relevant context, because the convention was held in secret and 
records did not become available until decades after the Constitution of 
1789 was ratified.52 
 
 49. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
 50. See infra Part IV.C.3.c.iii. 
 51. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 16, at 261–62 (“Since the presumption is a canon 
of interpretation and not a rule of constitutional law, a statute can explicitly or by clear 
implication be made retroactive.”). 
 52. For a valuable discussion of the relationship between implicature (a form of 
contextual enrichment) and constitutional interpretation, see Ryan C. Williams, The Ninth 
Amendment As a Rule of Construction, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 498, 543–44 (2011).  For a 
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In sum, the family of originalist theories has a core specified by the 
Fixation Thesis and the Constraint Principle.  Originalists may disagree at a 
deep theoretical level about the mechanisms of fixation, but they are likely 
to converge on the relevance of the public meaning of the text to the 
practical task of determining that meaning.  Originalists may disagree about 
the strength of the Constraint Principle, but they agree (at a minimum) that 
constitutional constructions must be consistent with the original meaning of 
the constitutional text. 
3.  The New Originalism and the Emergence of Constitutional Construction 
The phrase “the New Originalism”53 is used to describe the work of 
several theorists, especially Randy Barnett54 and Keith Whittington,55 and it 
is strongly associated with two ideas.  The first of these is the turn to public 
meaning—although that turn (by Scalia, Lawson, Calabresi, and Prakash) 
predates the widespread use of the appellation “New.”56  The second idea is 
constitutional construction (and the interpretation-construction 
distinction)—the topic of this Article.57  In 1999, Whittington brought the 
notion of constitutional construction into contemporary constitutional 
theory in two influential books, Constitutional Interpretation58 and 
Constitutional Construction.59  Barnett deployed Whittington’s distinction 
in his influential essay, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, also published 
 
discussion of the role of nonpublic constitutional history, see generally Kesavan & Paulsen, 
supra note 28. 
 53. The first occurrence of the phrase “New Originalism” in the Westlaw JLR database 
is by Evan Nadel. See Evan S. Nadel, The Amended Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 on 
Appeal:  Reconsidering Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corporation, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 
665, 691 n.191 (“An example of the “textualism” to which I refer is the “New Originalism” 
theory often associated with Justice Scalia.”).  Nadel cited William Eskridge, The New 
Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 650–56 (1990), which discusses Scalia but does not use 
the terms “originalist” or “originalism.”  Randy Barnett (without citing Nadel) used the 
phrase again in 1999. See Barnett, supra note 43, at 620.  Barnett’s use of the phrase was 
repeated by others. See Paul E. Salamanca, Choice Programs and Market-Based 
Separationism, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 817, 931 n.320 (2002).  Keith Whittington used the phrase 
in a conference paper entitled “The New Originalism” in 2002. See Michael Kent Curtis, 
Judicial Review and Populism, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 313, 318 n.23 (2003) (citing Keith 
E. Whittington, Professor, Princeton Univ., The New Originalism (June 8, 2002), available 
at http://www.aals.org/profdev/constitutional/whittington.pdf).  Whittington’s remarks were 
later published. See Whittington, supra note 9. 
 54. See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION (2004). 
 55. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION:  DIVIDED POWERS 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999) [hereinafter WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONSTRUCTION]; KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:  TEXTUAL 
MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999) [hereinafter WHITTINGTON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION]. 
 56. See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text. 
 57. An early use of the interpretation-construction distinction is found in Robert N. 
Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of ‘This 
Constitution,’ 72 IOWA L. REV. 1177, 1265 (1987). 
 58. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 55. 
 59. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION, supra note 55. 
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in 1999.60  Barnett and Whittington’s work in turn influenced Jack Balkin 
through his influential 2006 and 2007 essays, Abortion and Original 
Meaning61 and Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption,62 and his 
book, Living Originalism,63 which explicitly adopts the idea of 
constitutional construction.64  My own essay, The Interpretation-
Construction Distinction, explored the theoretical foundations of the 
distinction in the broader context of general legal theory.65 
The interpretation-construction distinction itself predates its role in New 
Originalist constitutional theorizing.  For example, the interpretation-
construction distinction was used by both Samuel Williston and Arthur 
Corbin to mark the difference between discovering the meaning of a 
contract (“contract interpretation”) and the determination of a contract’s 
legal effect (“contract construction”),66 and the distinction continues to play 
a role in contract law scholarship.67  But the distinction itself is older, 
dating back at least to 1839 when Franz Lieber published his Legal and 
Political Hermeneutics.68 
Because the interpretation-construction distinction is a technical 
distinction in legal theory, the meaning assigned to “interpretation” as 
opposed to “construction” is a function of technical usage and stipulation.  
The words “interpretation” and “construction” are used here to mark the 
real difference between two different activities.  We can use the phrase 
“constitutional practice” to designate the whole cluster of activities that 
judges, officials, and citizens perform when they act on the basis of 
constitutional norms.  We can then use the term “interpretation” to refer to 
the activity of discovering the linguistic meaning or communicative content 
of the constitutional text.  The term “construction” then can be used to refer 
to the activity of determining the legal effect given to the text. 
In some cases, giving the text legal effect might be unmediated; we read 
the text and put it into effect.  But in other cases, the legal effect of the text 
is mediated by doctrines of constitutional law.  The text of the First 
 
 60. See Barnett, supra note 43. 
 61. Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291 (2007). 
 62. Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. 
COMMENT. 427 (2007). 
 63. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011). 
 64. Id. at 23. 
 65. Solum, supra note 4. 
 66. See 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 532–35 (1960 & Supp. 1980); 
4 SAMUEL WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 600–02 (3d ed. 1961). 
 67. See Edwin W. Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 
COLUM. L. REV. 833 (1964); Keith A. Rowley, Contract Construction and Interpretation:  
From the “Four Corners” to Parol Evidence (and Everything in Between), 69 MISS. L.J. 73 
(1999). 
 68. FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS 43–44, 111 n.2 (Roy M. 
Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein eds., 1970) (1839).  Lieber’s definition of construction is 
related to the definition offered here:  “Construction is the drawing of conclusions respecting 
subjects, that lie beyond the direct expression of the text, from elements known and given in 
the text—conclusions which are in the spirit, though not within the letter of the text.” Id. at 
44.  For cases using the distinction, see infra notes 116–24 and accompanying text. 
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Amendment includes the phrase “freedom of speech” but constitutional 
decisions are mediated by a plethora of constitutional doctrines, including, 
for example, rules against prior restraints, rules governing public forums, 
and a complex doctrine governing obscenity.  When courts devise these 
doctrines as part of the process of determining the legal effect of the 
“freedom of speech,” they are engaging in constitutional construction—in 
the sense stipulated here. 
B.  The Construction Zone 
Given our stipulated definitions of “interpretation” and “construction,” it 
follows that every time we engage in constitutional practice, we are 
engaged in both interpretation and construction.  But in some cases, the 
activity of constitutional construction does not call attention to itself.  The 
legal effect of the text seems to flow automatically from its communicative 
content.  The constitutional text specifies that each state shall have two 
Senators.  Everyone understands that “state” refers to each of the fifty 
states, that “two” refers to the whole number two, and that “Senate” refers 
to a particular political institution, the U.S. Senate, which holds formal 
meetings in the U.S. Capitol building.  Once we grasp the communicative 
content of the text, the legal effect follows directly.  States hold elections 
for two and only two Senators—normally on a staggered basis as specified 
by Article I.  The Senate seats two and only two Senators per state.  Unlike 
the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, implementation of the 
Two Senators Clause does not require a large and complex body of 
constitutional doctrine.  Direct application of clear meaning involves 
construction, but the process of construction proceeds automatically 
because the meaning of the text is clear, and the legal effects that follow 
from that meaning are not subject to serious challenge. 
Construction becomes the focus of explicit attention when the meaning 
of the constitutional text is unclear, or the implications of that meaning are 
contested.69  Consider first a variety of ways in which communicative 
content of the constitutional text might be uncertain (or 
underdeterminate)—in particular, irreducible ambiguity, vagueness, gaps, 
and contradictions. 
A text is ambiguous if it can have more than one meaning.  For example, 
the word “cool” may be ambiguous—as between senses that refer to 
temperature, style, and temperament.  Thus, if the heat is not working on a 
cold day, we might say, “It is rather cool here.”  And if we admire 
someone’s personal style, we might say of her, “She is a cool chick.”  Or if 
someone holds his anger in check in the face of provocation, we might say 
of him, “He kept his cool.”  When communication succeeds, ambiguities 
are resolved by consideration of the context in which the communication 
occurs.  Thus, the prior uses of “cool” in this paragraph are disambiguated 
by context.  Let us use the term “reduce” to express the idea that ambiguity 
 
 69. This point about the phenomenology or psychology of legal practice is elaborated 
below. See infra Part IV.B. 
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can be liquidated by context.  Usually, clarity about sense is provided by 
context and hence surface-level ambiguity is reduced to unambiguous 
communicative content.  But it is sometimes the case that ambiguity is 
irreducible—uncertainty about the meaning of the text remains, even after 
we consider context.  For example, if legislators are unable to agree on a 
particular point they might use deliberately ambiguous language—kicking 
the can down the road for judicial resolution of the contested issue. 
Now, consider vagueness.  The words “ambiguity” and “vagueness” are 
sometimes used interchangeably, but I am now referring to “vagueness” in 
the technical (or more precise) sense in which it refers to expressions that 
have borderline cases.  Thus, the word “tall” can be used with respect to 
persons:  Danny DeVito (the actor) is short, but Hasheem Thabeet (the 
NBA player) is tall.  In the context of assessing the height of adult males in 
the United States, there are men who are neither clearly tall nor clearly not 
tall.  If the average American adult male is 5’9.5” in height, is a 5’11” man 
tall?  There is no bright line, hence there are borderline cases, and therefore 
the word “tall” is vague in this context. 
The text of the Constitution contains provisions that appear to be vague.  
For example, Articles I, II, and III of the Constitution assign “legislative 
power” to Congress, “executive power” to the president, and “judicial 
power” to the Supreme Court and such lower courts as Congress shall 
establish.  Some actions seem to clearly fit in one and only one of these 
categories.  Resolving tort or contract disputes between individuals is a 
clear case of an exercise of judicial power.  But other cases seem uncertain:  
President Barack Obama’s directive regarding the deportation of 
undocumented persons who came to the United States as children might be 
classified as an exercise of legislative power, but it might also be seen as an 
executive action pursuant to discretionary executive power over the 
prosecutorial function.  If President Obama’s action were truly a borderline 
case, that fact would reveal that that the constitutional categories of 
legislative, executive, and judicial power are vague.70 
Next, consider contradiction.  One hopes that legal texts do not contain 
contradictory provisions, but the drafters of legal texts (including the 
Framers of the Constitution) are imperfect humans, and hence it is possible 
for them to write a text that, if followed, would require inconsistent 
outcomes in the same case.  It is possible that the text of the U.S. 
Constitution is perfectly consistent, but at least some readers believe that 
there are contradictions.  For example, a panel of the Ninth Circuit (later 
reversed en banc) concluded that there was a “tension” or inconsistency 
between the Good Behavior Clause of Article III, which is understood to 
confer life tenure on federal judges, and the Recess Appointments Clause of 
Article II, which allows the president to make temporary appointments to 
various offices without explicit exclusion of federal judgeships.71  Suppose 
 
 70. This idea is elaborated in Figure 7, infra. 
 71. United States v. Woodley, 726 F.2d 1328, 1329 (1983) (“We are thus called upon to 
address the inherent tension between the so-called recess appointment clause, which on its 
2013]  CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 471 
that these two provisions are actually in contradiction; it would then follow 
that we could not determine their constitutional effect by simply applying 
the clear meaning of the text.  Construction would be required, creating 
either an exception to the life tenure rule for recess appointments or a 
limitation on the recess appointments power, excluding federal judges. 
Finally, consider gaps.  As I am using the term “gap,” it refers to a 
situation in which the constitutional text requires the existence of a rule of 
constitutional law but does not provide the content of that rule (or explicitly 
delegate the task of providing content to some constitutional institution or 
actor).  Whittington has suggested that the absence of a constitutional 
provision regarding the removal of federal officers may be a constitutional 
gap; presidents either have a unilateral power of removal or they do not, but 
the constitutional text simply does not address the question.72 
Irreducible ambiguity, vagueness, contradictions, and gaps create 
constitutional questions that cannot be resolved simply by giving direct 
effect to the rule of constitutional law that directly corresponds to the 
communicative content of the constitutional text.  Such cases are 
underdetermined by the meaning of the text—they are in the construction 
zone. 
FIGURE 1:  THE CONSTRUCTION ZONE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
face applies to vacancies in any government office, and section 1 of article III which 
provides that only judges with article III protection may exercise the judicial power of the 
United States.  We are required to decide, in other words, whether the recess appointment 
power of the President applies to vacancies in the judicial as well as the executive branch of 
government.”). 
 72. Keith E. Whittington, Constructing a New American Constitution, 27 CONST. 
COMMENT. 119, 123–24 (2010) (“Arguably, the removal power is an instance of such a gap.  
The U.S. Constitution specifies how executive branch officials are to be appointed, but does 
not specify how they are to be removed from office, except by impeachment.  The First 
Congress puzzled over several alternatives as to how officers might be removed and how 
such removals might be constitutionally justified.  The statutes creating the Cabinet 
departments settled on unilateral presidential removal, but there was little agreement in 
Congress over the rationale behind that settlement.  A removal power is a requisite part of 
the constitutional scheme.”). 
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The construction zone consists of constitutional cases or issues that 
cannot be resolved by the direct translation of the constitutional text into 
rules of constitutional law that determine their outcome.  The necessity for 
constitutional construction becomes obvious in the construction zone; 
giving legal effect to the meaning of the text underdetermines its legal 
effect.  But this leaves important questions open:  How substantial is the 
construction zone?  In other words, is the construction zone empty, sparsely 
populated, or densely backed with issues and cases? 
Some originalists may believe that the Constitution’s text fully 
determines the content of constitutional doctrine; they deny the existence of 
the construction zone.  Other originalists may believe that the Constitution 
is internally consistent, gapless, and unambiguous—leaving only a 
relatively minor zone of constitutional underdetermination created by 
residual vagueness.  And a final group of originalists may believe that many 
of the most important provisions of the Constitution (e.g., the power 
allocating provisions of the first three Articles and the major individual 
rights provisions) are substantially vague, resulting in a large and pervasive 
construction zone.73 
C.  A Note on the Role of Normativity in the Construction Zone 
Constitutional interpretation is essentially a factually driven enterprise.  
The communicative content of the text is determined by facts about 
conventional semantic meanings and syntax, on the one hand, and facts 
about the relevant context of constitutional communication on the other.  
Constitutional construction is not driven by facts in the same way.  Rather, 
construction is essentially driven by normative concerns.  There may be 
disagreements about what kinds of norms are relevant and whether those 
norms should be considered on particular issues in particular cases, or 
whether the relevant norms operate systemically.  Moreover, some theories 
of constitutional construction may be driven by considerations of political 
morality, whereas other theories may look to norms that are internal to legal 
practice.  The abstract fact that construction is essentially normative does 
not entail any particular account of the norms that ought to govern the 
practice of construction. 
The range of normative possibilities can be illustrated by considering two 
different theories of constitutional construction.  Both of these theories are 
originalist in the sense that they both accept the Fixation Thesis and the 
Constraint Principle.  Let us stipulate that both theories accept the existence 
of a substantial construction zone—operating with respect to vague 
constitutional provisions like “freedom of speech” and the power grants in 
the first three Articles.  We will call the two theories the “Moral Readings 
Theory” of constitutional construction and the “Originalist Thayerian 
 
 73. The questions whether the construction zone exists and whether it is substantial are 
addressed below. See infra Part IV. 
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Theory”74 of constitutional construction (or “Originalist Thayerianism”).  
As presented here, these are “toy” theories—not fully developed versions.  
They are chosen to represent polar opposite possibilities, and not to 
represent the mainstream of originalism generally or the New Originalism 
in particular. 
The Moral Readings Theory contends that the resolution of constitutional 
issues in the construction zone should be guided directly by considerations 
of political morality.  For example, if the phrase “equal protection of the 
laws” is vague, we should directly consider our views about the value of 
equality—adopting the construction of the Equal Protection Clause that 
coheres with the morally best theory of equality.75  The Moral Readings 
theory fills the construction zone with content directly selected on the basis 
of political morality. 
The Originalist Thayerian Theory contends that the judicial resolution of 
constitutional issues in the construction zone should avoid any direct 
reliance on judges’ first-order views about political morality.76  Originalist 
Thayerians believe that outside the construction zone, judges should give 
legal effect to the clear meaning of the constitutional text.  But when the 
meaning of the text is unclear or uncertain, then judges should defer to 
decisions made by the political branches.  Thus, in a case where the 
requirements of equal protection are unclear (because of vagueness, for 
example), judges should refrain from declaring legislative or executive 
action unconstitutional.  Originalist Thayerians rely on normative 
considerations as the basis for this rule of construction.  They believe that 
judicial invalidation of democratically enacted legislation is only legitimate 
when the meaning of the Constitution is clear; otherwise, the value of 
democratic legitimacy requires judges to defer to the political branches.  
Normative considerations are operating here, but only indirectly via the 
justification for the Thayerian principle of deference. 
The Moral Readings Theory and Originalist Thayerianism are 
illustrative, but there are many other possible views about constitutional 
construction in cases of underdeterminacy.  One might apply a presumption 
of liberty or adopt a common law method of construction that gives great 
weight to precedents and background principles developed by common law 
courts.  For our purposes on this occasion, the important point is that there 
are several possible approaches to the construction zone that are consistent 
with the core commitments of originalism to fixation and constraint. 
 
 74. Originalist Thayerianism is so named because of its affinity to James Thayer’s 
approach to judicial review.  Thayer’s classic text is JAMES B. THAYER, THE ORIGIN AND 
SCOPE OF THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1893). 
 75. See generally James E. Fleming, Living Originalism and Living Constitutionalism As 
Moral Readings of the American Constitution, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1171 (2012).  Fleming does 
not describe himself as an originalist. 
 76. The Originalist Thayerian Theory is related to and inspired by the views of Gary 
Lawson and Michael Paulsen. See infra Part IV.C.  Lawson and Paulsen both believe that 
default rules resolving cases in the construction zone follow from the meaning of the 
constitutional text.  That argument is addressed below in Part IV.C.3. 
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D.  A New Originalist Lexicon 
At this point, our abbreviated investigation of originalism and the 
interpretation-construction distinction is complete.  We can summarize the 
discussion so far in the form of a New Originalist Lexicon—a brief 
recapitulation of the key concepts. 
 Originalism:  A family of constitutional theories that agree on the 
Fixation Thesis and the Constraint Principle. 
 The Fixation Thesis:  The claim that the communicative content of the 
constitutional text is fixed at the time each provision is framed and 
ratified. 
 The Constraint Principle:  The claim that the legal content of 
constitutional doctrine should be constrained by the communicative 
content of the constitutional text. 
 Semantic Content:  The conventional semantic meaning of the words 
and phrases ordered by syntax and grammar. 
 Contextual Enrichment:  The addition to or modification of the 
semantic content of a text or utterance made by the context in which 
the text was written or the utterance was said. 
 Communicative Content:  The contextually enriched semantic content 
of a text or utterance—also referred to as “linguistic meaning” or 
“meaning.” 
 New Originalism:  Constitutional theories that are members of the 
originalist family (accepting the Fixation Thesis and the Constraint 
Principle) and that additionally affirm the public meaning thesis and 
the interpretation-construction distinction. 
 Public Meaning Thesis:  The claim that the communicative content of 
the constitutional text is determined by the semantic meaning of the 
text as enriched by the publicly available context of constitutional 
communication. 
 Interpretation-Construction Distinction:  The distinction between 
interpretation (discovery of meaning) and construction (determination 
of legal effect). 
 Constitutional Interpretation:  An activity that is part of constitutional 
practice and aims at the recovery of the communicative content of the 
constitutional text. 
 Constitutional Construction:  An activity that is part of constitutional 
practice and aims at the determination of the legal content of 
constitutional doctrine and/or the legal effect to be given to the 
constitutional text. 
 Legal Content:  The legal norms that attach to an authoritative legal 
text; in the case of the Constitution, constitutional doctrine articulated 
by courts, or constitutional norms implicitly or explicitly articulated by 
nonjudicial constitutional actors. 
 Constitutional Practice:  Actions taken on the basis of constitutional 
interpretation and construction, including constitutional adjudication in 
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the courts, and actions by nonjudicial officials that are guided by 
constitutional norms. 
 Construction Zone:  The set of constitutional issues and cases for 
which the communicative content of the constitutional text 
underdetermines legal effect, e.g., the legal content of constitutional 
doctrine and the resolution of constitutional cases. 
With this summary in place, we can now turn to some preliminary 
objections to the interpretation-construction distinction itself. 
II.  A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY AND CONCEPTUAL CLARITY 
At this point, we need to consider five preliminary objections to the 
interpretation-construction distinction.  A sense of these objections is 
conveyed by the following questions: 
 Why should we care about the interpretation-construction distinction?  
Are these just labels for familiar features of constitutional practice? 
 Aren’t “interpretation” and “construction” synonyms?  Isn’t it 
misleading and semantically incorrect to use them to mark the 
distinction between meaning and effect? 
 Doesn’t the use of the term “interpretation” for the discovery of 
linguistic meaning load the dice in favor of originalism?  Shouldn’t 
living constitutionalists be able to describe their method of 
constitutional practice as “interpretation”? 
 Is there really a difference between meaning and legal effect?  In legal 
practice, aren’t the two synonymous? 
 Doesn’t the interpretation-construction distinction obscure other 
important conceptual distinctions, including the distinction between 
constitutional “interpretation” and constitutional “implementation”? 
Before we deal with these questions, I should make one important 
observation.  The use of the terms “interpretation” and “construction” to 
mark the distinction between meaning and effect is not itself important.  We 
could use a different vocabulary.  For example, we might say “linguistic 
interpretation” and “constructive interpretation.”  Or we might differentiate 
“finding meaning” from “determining legal effect.”  Whatever vocabulary 
we use, we are marking a theoretical distinction that is not fully reflected in 
common usage.  This means that we must rely on stipulated definitions or 
patterns of usage among communities of specialists—in this case 
constitutional scholars and other legal theorists.  In this Article, I have 
stipulated definitions of “interpretation” and “construction” and argued that 
these stipulated definitions capture the underlying conceptual point of the 
interpretation-construction distinction that has been employed by a variety 
of contemporary originalists.77  Moreover, my stipulated definitions are 
consistent with a pattern of usage by courts and legal scholars, as noted 
 
 77. See supra notes 54–61 and accompanying text. 
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above78 and more fully elaborated below.79  Towards the end of this Part, I 
will argue that “interpretation” and “construction” are the best words to use 
to express the interpretation-construction distinction,80 but that argument is 
about clarity and consistency and not theoretical substance. 
A.  The Cash Value of Conceptual Clarity 
The first objection is that the distinction between interpretation and 
construction is arid or unproductive; call this the “Aridity Objection.”  
Someone who made this objection might concede that we can distinguish 
between the meaning of the constitutional text and its legal effect, but deny 
that there is any payoff or point to doing this.  The issue raised by the 
objection is certainly important; the interpretation-construction distinction 
is only worth marking if there is some payoff.  We can begin by examining 
a version of the Aridity Objection based on ideas drawn from American 
legal realism.  (Before proceeding, I note that I will not address the 
argument that the interpretation-construction is undermined by the radical 
indeterminacy of law in general or constitutional law in particular—some 
brief remarks can be found in the accompanying footnote.81) 
Here is one version of the Aridity Objection.  Realists emphasize 
importance of the “law in action” as distinguished from the “law in the 
books”—the phrasing is from Roscoe Pound’s famous article.82  This realist 
insight is related to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s famous observation 
about the bad man: 
You can see very plainly that a bad man has as much reason as a good one 
for wishing to avoid an encounter with the public force, and therefore you 
can see the practical importance of the distinction between morality and 
law.  A man who cares nothing for an ethical rule which is believed and 
practised by his neighbors is likely nevertheless to care a good deal to 
avoid being made to pay money, and will want to keep out of jail if he 
can.83 
And: 
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad 
man, who cares only for the material consequences which such 
knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his 
 
 78. See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text. 
 79. See infra notes 116–25 and accompanying text. 
 80. See infra Part II.F.2. 
 81. The objection might be stated as follows.  The meaning of the constitutional text is 
radically indeterminate, because any conceivable legal effect can be argued to be consistent 
with (or required by) that meaning:  therefore, “interpretation” cannot do any work in 
constitutional practice, and hence it cannot be meaningfully distinguished from 
“construction.”  In my view, this objection fails because it is based on a slide from the fact of 
constitutional underdeterminacy (embraced by proponents of the interpretation-construction 
distinction) to the unwarranted claim that the law is radically indeterminate (the strong 
indeterminacy thesis). See generally Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Thesis:  
Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462 (1987). 
 82. Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 32–33 (1910). 
 83. Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897). 
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reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer 
sanctions of conscience.84 
Holmes’s bad man cares about “the law in action,” but has no use for the 
“the law in the books” except insofar as it provides a useful guide to what 
the legal system will actually do.85 
A realist critic of the interpretation-construction distinction might argue 
that the point of the bad-man thought experiment is that the law in action is 
the only thing that matters.  The law on the books is simply irrelevant.  
Thus, a realist might argue that we should collapse the interpretation-
construction distinction.  There may be a conceptual difference between the 
linguistic meaning of the constitutional text and the legal effect of 
constitutional doctrine, but only the latter can matter.  Hence, the realist 
critic might argue that construction swallows interpretation, and thus that 
the distinction between interpretation and construction has no cash value86 
or real world payoff. 
But this criticism would be fundamentally confused.  Our hypothetical 
realist critic relies on Pound’s distinction between the law on the books and 
the law and action.  But at this point, I am sure that readers will recognize 
that Pound’s distinction is simply a variation on the interpretation-
construction distinction.  Interpretation is the discovery of the meaning of 
“the law in the books.”  Construction is the determination of “the law in 
action.”  Thus, a variation of the interpretation-construction distinction is 
one of the foundational ideas of American legal realism—although the 
realists may not have used this vocabulary. 
Moreover, the interpretation-construction distinction can be an important 
tool in normative criticism of the law.  If we collapse the distinction, then 
there is no difference between the meaning of the constitutional text and the 
legal effect given to the text by judges in the form of intermediate doctrines 
of constitutional law and decisions in constitutional cases.  This conflation 
of meaning and effect makes it impossible to criticize a judicial decision on 
the ground that it is inconsistent with the text—such an argument makes no 
sense unless the communicative content of the text is distinct from the legal 
effect that it produces. 
Moreover, collapsing meaning and effect reduces the transparency of 
legal decisionmaking.  In the context of contract law, Farnsworth observed 
that courts “often ignore [the interpretation-construction distinction] by 
characterizing the process of construction as that of ‘interpretation’ in order 
to obscure the extent of their control over private agreement.”87  A similar 
point could be made about constitutional law; collapsing the interpretation-
 
 84. Id. 
 85. For the connection between Holmes and Pound, see Albert W. Alschuler, The 
Descending Trail:  Holmes’ Path of the Law One Hundred Years Later, 49 FLA. L. REV. 353, 
368 (1997); Sanford Levinson, National Loyalty, Communalism, and the Professional 
Identity of Lawyers, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 49, 56–57 (1995). 
 86. See WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM 200 (1907) (“What, in short, is the truth’s cash-
value in experiential terms?”). 
 87. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.7, at 478 (1982). 
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construction distinction obscures judicial decisions that control the legal 
effect given to the constitutional text. 
This point about the critical force of the interpretation-construction 
distinction suggests that some legal advocates might have a practical reason 
for conflating meaning and effect and hence for resisting the interpretation-
construction distinction.  If you were arguing for a result that is inconsistent 
with the meaning (communicative content) of the text, it would be 
convenient if your theory of “interpretation” did not require you to confront 
that meaning directly.  This is especially likely to be the case if amendment 
of the text through the procedures specified in Article V is not politically 
feasible, as is frequently the case.  If one can argue that departing from the 
meaning of the text is actually just “interpretation,” then one does not have 
to explicitly advocate a judicial power to override or amend the 
Constitution.  Because such a power is likely to be criticized on the ground 
that it is illegitimate, a savvy advocate will attempt to couch the argument 
for judicial revision of the Constitution as an argument for “interpretation.”  
Erasing the interpretation-construction distinction opens the door for this 
strategy, which relies on obscurity of expression to avoid transparency. 
This does not mean that revitalization of the interpretation-construction 
distinction shuts the door on constitutional change, but it does mean that it 
changes the terms of debate.  Those who advocate constitutional change 
could proceed in many different ways.  One possibility is suggested by 
Michael Seidman’s recent work.  In his book, Constitutional Disobedience, 
Seidman explicitly argues that we should no longer treat the Constitution as 
binding law.88  Another possibility is suggested by Sanford Levinson, who 
argues for thoroughgoing constitutional reform by amendment.89  And there 
are other alternatives.  The Supreme Court might explicitly adopt a radically 
Thayerian approach to constitutional construction—abstaining from almost 
all constitutional cases and leaving the real work of constitutional 
interpretation and construction to the political branches and popular will.  
Mark Tushnet made a version of this suggestion in his book, Taking the 
Constitution Away from the Courts.90  A less radical suggestion would be 
for the courts to become more transparent about the relationship of 
constitutional doctrine to the constitutional text, openly embracing the 
power to adopt amendment constructions of the Constitution.  One might 
imagine that nominees for the Supreme Court would eschew declarations 
that they are just umpires, calling balls and strikes, or disingenuously 
suggesting that we are all originalists now.  Instead, they might clearly state 
that they believe they have the power to make decisions that are 
inconsistent with the meaning of the text. 
 
 88. MICHAEL SEIDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE (2013). 
 89. SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION:  WHERE THE 
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2008); see also 
SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED:  AMERICA’S 51 CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS OF 
GOVERNANCE (2012). 
 90. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (2000). 
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Of course, it is likely that all of these options will be controversial.  
Many academics, judges, lawyers, officials, and ordinary citizens will 
defend the Constitution and the role of the judiciary against criticisms like 
those offered by Seidman, Levinson, and Tushnet.  It is not clear that a 
nominee who openly embraced judicial power to amend the Constitution 
could be confirmed under almost any realistic political scenario.  The 
division of opinion about constitutional fundamentals means that a more 
honest debate about the relationship between the constitutional text and the 
power of the judiciary could go in any number of directions.  But such a 
debate would at least have the virtue of transparency and, hence, openness 
to democratic politics and serious academic criticism. 
This line of response to the realist critique of the interpretation-
construction distinction focuses on the big questions about judicial power 
and the authority of the text.  But the value of distinction can also be 
defended on narrower and more modest grounds.  The interpretation-
construction distinction brings conceptual clarity to constitutional practice.  
When we blur the distinction between meaning and desired effect, we are at 
risk of conceptual confusion and motivated reasoning.  For example, we 
might allow our beliefs about the desirability of certain legal effects to 
influence our judgments about the linguistic meaning of the text.  The slide 
from meaning to effect is easy if we call both activities “interpretation.”  
Linguistic meaning is determined by linguistic facts and facts about the 
context of communication.  It is simply a conceptual error to believe that 
our normative beliefs about what a text should mean can determine what the 
text actually does mean. 
The danger of conceptual confusion that arises from collapsing the 
interpretation-construction distinction is illustrated by the influential 
approach to constitutional interpretation and construction articulated by 
Philip Bobbitt91 and Stephen Griffin.92  The gist of this approach is that 
there are multiple modalities or a plurality of methods for establishing the 
truth or validity of a constitutional doctrine or decision.  If we collapse the 
interpretation-construction distinction, then each of the modalities (or 
methods) seems to bear on “interpretation” and hence becomes “meaning” 
in the sense of communicative content.  But once we have the 
interpretation-construction distinction, we can see that some of Bobbitt’s 
modalities and Griffin’s methods are actually inputs to constitutional 
construction, while others can be seen as relevant to construction via their 
contribution to interpretation.  These abstract points will be clarified if we 
examine their application to Bobbitt’s theory in greater depth. 
We can begin with Bobbitt’s enumeration of six modalities.  They are: 
 historical (relying on the intentions of the framers and ratifiers of the 
Constitution); 
 
 91. See BOBBITT, supra note 22. 
 92. See Griffin, supra note 23. 
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 textual (looking to the meaning of the words of the Constitution alone, 
as they would be interpreted by the average contemporary “man on the 
street”); 
 structural (inferring rules from the relationships that the Constitution 
mandates among the structures it sets up); 
 doctrinal (applying rules generated by precedent); 
 ethical (deriving rules from those moral commitments of the American 
ethos that are reflected in the Constitution); and 
 prudential (seeking to balance the costs and benefits of a particular 
rule).93 
Before we proceed further, we should note Bobbitt’s use of the word 
“modality”94—a word borrowed from philosophy where it expresses the 
manner in which a statement or proposition’s truth holds.95  In a footnote, I 
discuss the implications of Bobbitt’s theoretical move,96 but for our 
purposes we can view the modalities as argument types (or methods) 
following Bobbitt’s earlier work97 and Griffin’s idea of a plurality of 
methods.98  Thus, each modality is an argument type or interpretive 
method.  The six modalities are all on a level plane.  We can represent this 
picture graphically as follows:   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 93. BOBBITT, supra note 22, at 12–13 (emphasis added) (paragraph structure altered and 
bullets added). 
 94. Id. at 11–12. 
 95. Anand Vaidya, The Epistemology of Modality, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Dec. 5, 
2007), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/modality-epistemology/. 
 96. Viewing Bobbitt’s theory as involving modality or truthmaking renders his theory 
peculiar.  The central instances of modality in philosophy are necessity and possibility.  We 
can understand what it means for a proposition to be necessarily true:  such a proposition is 
true in all possible worlds.  Likewise, a proposition is possibly true if it is true in at least one 
possible world.  But what does it even mean to say that a proposition of constitutional law is 
“textually true” or “prudentially true”?  The philosophical modalities are related to one 
another:  if a proposition is necessarily true, then it follows as a matter of logic that it is 
possibly true, and so forth, but one cannot add up the philosophical modalities to produce 
“overall” truth—as one might weigh prudential and ethical arguments.  Bobbitt’s text makes 
it clear that he is using modality in the philosophical sense, but his explanation of the 
modalities is short, and it is not clear that he has a coherent theory of the modal nature of the 
categories of argument that he lays out. 
 97. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982). 
 98. See Griffin, supra note 23. 
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FIGURE 2:  MULTIPLE MODALITIES MODEL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Multiple Modalities Model collapses the interpretation-construction 
distinction.  The inevitable result is conceptual confusion.  Historical 
evidence relevant to the communicative content of the text is put at the 
same level as prudential concerns.  There is no hierarchy or ordering of the 
roles played by each of the modalities.  Worst of all, this model suggests 
that the prudential and ethical modalities are somehow relevant to the 
determination of constitutional meaning in the linguistic sense—a 
substantial conceptual error. 
Now, consider an alternative picture that takes the interpretation-
construction distinction into account.  Three of the modalities (historical, 
textual, and structural) are directly relevant to the discovery of 
communicative content (and hence interpretation).  And communicative 
content itself is relevant to the determination of legal effect (construction).  
The other three modalities (doctrinal, ethical, and prudential) are directly 
relevant to construction, but do not bear directly on interpretation. 
FIGURE 3:  TWO MOMENTS MODEL (FOR MULTIPLE MODALITIES) 
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By distinguishing between interpretation and construction, we are able to 
distinguish the conceptual difference between the roles played by the 
modalities.  This particular version of the model is based on Public 
Meaning Originalism and a theory of construction that allows for the 
consideration of precedent, ethos, and prudential factors.  A different 
version of the model could substitute for the Thayerian Originalist principle 
of deference as the method that applies in the construction zone.  But as 
long as we retain the basic shape of the Two Moments Model we can avoid 
the conceptual confusion produced by the conflation of interpretation and 
construction. 
Bobbitt or Griffin might respond to this criticism by adopting a variation 
on the Multiple Modalities Model.  They could accept the interpretation-
construction distinction, but maintain that interpretation is just one of 
several modalities.  Their modified picture might look something like this:   
FIGURE 4:  MODIFIED MULTIPLE MODALITIES MODEL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This modified version of the model preserves the living-constitutionalist99 
idea that doctrine, ethos, or prudential concerns can trump the 
communicative content of the constitutional text, but it avoids the 
conceptual confusion that results from conflating the interpretation-
construction distinction.100 
 
 99. By “Living Constitutionalism,” I mean to refer to views holding that the legal 
content of constitutional doctrine changes over time. See generally Lawrence B. Solum, 
Faith and Fidelity:  Originalism and the Possibility of Constitutional Redemption, 91 TEX. 
L. REV. 147, 154–62 (elucidating the nature and history of living constitutionalism); see also 
infra Table 1 (defining living constitutionalism). 
 100. The modified version of the Multiple Modalities Model presented in Figure 4 is too 
simple.  For example, history can be relevant as a source of contextual enrichment and hence 
of communicative content, but historical practice might also be relevant to constitutional 
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The interpretation-construction distinction provides another form of cash 
value by opening the door to recognition of the construction zone.  And that 
recognition can improve originalist practice.  Originalists may be tempted 
to argue that the original meaning of the constitutional text provides an 
answer to every constitutional question.  Once they understand the 
distinction between interpretation and construction, originalists become 
open to the possibility that the linguistic meaning of the constitutional text 
may sometimes underdetermine the outcome of constitutional cases.  That 
realization then can serve as a check against the tendency to see bright lines 
where the meaning of the text is vague.  Of course, the recognition of 
vagueness does not entail the conclusion that judges are licensed to bring 
political morality to bear directly in constitutional decisionmaking:  the 
possibility of default rules requiring deference to democratic 
decisionmaking demonstrates that vagueness does not entail discretion.  But 
the case for a deferential approach to constitutional construction can only be 
made clearly and honestly if we recognize the existence of the construction 
zone.101 
In sum, there are good reasons to believe that the interpretation-
construction distinction has cash value.  That value is delivered via 
conceptual clarity, but the ultimate payoff is increased transparency and 
diminished confusion in constitutional argument and deliberation.  The 
realist critique of the interpretation-construction distinction is both 
internally inconsistent and misguided, as evidenced by the fact that the 
realist distinction between the law in the books and the law in action 
depends on the distinction between meaning and effect and, thus, 
presupposes the interpretation-construction distinction. 
B.  The Garner-Scalia Objection:  Interpretation and 
Construction Are Synonymous 
The interpretation-construction distinction has also come under fire from 
an altogether different angle.  Garner and Scalia object to the distinction on 
grounds articulated in their book, Reading Law:  The Interpretation of 
Legal Texts.102  I will quote their objection with some minor omissions: 
 Modern nontextualism is based in part on an equivocal use of the word 
construction, which is the noun corresponding to construe.  When 
construing a statute, one engages in statutory construction, which has 
long been used interchangeably with the phrase statutory interpretation.  
When one is construing a constitutional text one is engaged in 
constitutional construction or again, constitutional interpretation.  When 
construing a contract, one is likewise engaged in contractual 
 
construction.  A more comprehensive version would take this and other complexities into 
account. 
 101. For discussion of deference as a principle of constitutional construction, see infra 
Part IV.C. 
 102. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 16. 
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construction—though the usual phrase is contractual interpretation.  So 
far, so good.103 
 Oddly enough, though, the noun construction answers both to construe 
(meaning “to interpret”) and to construct (meaning to build). . . . 
 . . . .104 
 As it happens, nontextualists have latched onto the duality of 
construction.  From the germ of an idea in the theoretical works of Franz 
Lieber, scholars have elaborated a supposed distinction between 
interpretation and construction . . . .105  Thus is born, out of false 
linguistic association, a whole new field of legal inquiry.106 
 But the equivocal nature of construction has positively done harm in 
the work of constitutional theorists.  [Balkin], for example, has recently 
written [Living Originalism]107 largely premised on the distinction. . . .108  
Even some textualists [citing Lawrence Solum] have embraced the 
distinction so as to contrast the legitimacy of constitutional interpretation 
with the relative illegitimacy of so-called constitutional construction.109 
 But this supposed distinction between interpretation and construction 
has never reflected the courts’ actual usage. . . .110 
This passage makes two distinct points:  first, an argument that the 
interpretation-construction distinction rests on linguistic confusion, and 
second, an argument that the terminology used to express the distinction is 
not consistent with judicial usage. 
The argument that the interpretation-construction distinction either 
originates with or rests on linguistic confusion (“born out of false linguistic 
association”) is simply mistaken as a matter of fact.  First and foremost, 
proponents of the interpretation-construction distinction have clearly and 
unequivocally stated that the terminology itself is technical.  When used by 
legal theorists to express the distinction, “interpretation” and “construction” 
are terms of art with a long history of usage.111  Moreover, those who use 
 
 103. Id. at 13. 
 104. The omitted paragraph deals with the use of the verb “construction” in expressions 
like “constructing a statute”.  I agree that this usage is nonstandard, but that point has no 
bearing on the interpretation-construction distinction itself. 
 105. The omitted passage and accompanying note refers selectively to the academic 
literature, citing WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 55, Barnett, 
supra note 54, and Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1, 10 
(2009). 
 106. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 16, at 15. 
 107. BALKIN, supra note 63. 
 108. The omitted passage provides quotations from id. 
 109. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 16, at 16–17. 
 110. Id. at 15.  The omitted passage quotes from sources supporting the proposition that 
interpretation and construction are synonymous.  Footnote fifty also cites McGinnis & 
Rappaport, supra note 45, with the following parenthetical:  “noting that the distinction 
between interpretation and construction is conceptually and historically unfounded.” SCALIA 
& GARNER, supra note 16, at 15 n.50. 
 111. Solum, supra note 4, at 95 (“One more caveat:  although the distinction between 
‘interpretation’ and ‘construction’ is indispensible, those particular words are being used in a 
technical sense.  A different vocabulary could be used to denote the distinction.”). 
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the distinction are frequently careful to acknowledge the fact that the 
particular words used to express the distinction are unimportant.  For 
example, in an article titled The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 
published in Constitutional Commentary in 2010 (two years before the 
publication of Garner and Scalia’s book), I wrote, “[T]he difference 
between interpretation and construction is real and fundamental.  Although 
the terminology (the words ‘interpretation’ and ‘construction’ that express 
the distinction) could vary, legal theorists cannot do without the 
distinction.”112 
So it is clear that the use of the word “construction” to describe the 
process of determining the legal effect of the text is not a product of 
linguistic confusion.  Indeed, so far as I am aware, no contemporary theorist 
who uses the interpretation-construction distinction has ever confused the 
word “construe” with the word “construct,” although it is true that 
“construction” is sometimes used in a metaphorical sense.113  I do this 
myself when I discuss “the construction zone.”  Metaphor and linguistic 
confusion are two different phenomena. 
Second, the argument that the distinction arose from linguistic confusion 
commits the genetic fallacy.  Suppose that Scalia and Garner had been right, 
and that a linguistic mistake had been the causal mechanism by which the 
interpretation-construction distinction came into being.  That fact would not 
establish that the distinction between the communicative content of the 
constitutional text and legal effect given to the text by constitutional 
doctrine does not exist.  The psychological mechanism that gave rise to the 
distinction is simply irrelevant to its correctness or truth; to argue otherwise 
is simply a classic version of the genetic fallacy (the claim that the causal or 
psychological origin of a claim is relevant to its truth).114 
Garner and Scalia’s second argument is “this supposed distinction 
between interpretation and construction has never reflected the courts’ 
actual usage.”115  Again, their claim is simply incorrect.  There are, in fact, 
a variety of reported cases that do employ the interpretation-construction 
distinction.  Consider the following passages from judicial opinions (in 
reverse chronological order).  Each passage unambiguously relies upon the 
distinction between interpretation (as the discovery of meaning) and 
construction (as the determination of legal effect).  Each passage is “actual 
usage” by a court: 
 
 112. Id. at 96; see also id. at 103 n.19 (explicitly noting that the definitions of 
“interpretation” and “construction” are stipulated). 
 113. Garner and Scalia note metaphorical uses by Jack Balkin, who contrasts “Framework 
Originalism” with “Skyscraper Originalism.” See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 16, at 16–
17. 
 114. Genetic Fallacy, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY (Ted Honderich ed., 
new ed. 2005). 
 115. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 16, at 35 (emphasis added to “never”). 
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 “Contract interpretation ‘is a process for determining the meaning of 
words in a contract,’ whereas construction ‘is a process of 
determining the legal effect of such words.’”116 
 “Interpretation and construction of written instruments are not the 
same.  A rule of construction is one which either governs the effect of 
an ascertained intention, or points out what the court should do in the 
absence of express or implied intention, while a rule of interpretation 
is one which governs the ascertainment of the meaning of the maker 
of the instrument.”117 
 “Before examining the specific issues raised herein an overview of 
the problems of interpretation of contracts is necessary.  We use the 
word ‘interpretation’ in the sense described by Corbin and the 
Restatement and distinguish it from ‘construction.’ Corbin states:  
‘Interpretation is the process whereby one person gives a meaning to 
the symbols of expression used by another person.’  The Restatement 
definition is:  ‘Interpretation of a promise or agreement or a term 
thereof is the ascertainment of its meaning.’”118 
 “Interpretation, the meaning of insurance policy words, is an issue for 
the court unless it depends on extrinsic evidence or on a choice 
among reasonable inferences from extrinsic evidence. Construction, 
the legal effect of a policy, is always a matter of law to be decided by 
the court.”119 
 “The rule is essentially one of legal effect, of ‘construction’ rather 
than ‘interpretation,’ since ‘it can scarcely be said to be designed to 
ascertain the meanings attached by the parties.’”120 
 “Interpretation involves ascertaining the meaning of contractual 
words; construction refers to deciding their legal effect.  
Interpretation is reviewed as a legal issue unless it depended at the 
trial level on extrinsic evidence.  Construction is always reviewed as a 
law issue.”121 
 “When the question is one of ‘construction’ as distinguished from 
‘interpretation’ of the contract, the issue is one of law.”122 
 “In the law of contracts (conventional obligations) a proper distinction 
exists between the ‘interpretation’ of written instruments and their 
‘construction.’  ‘Interpretation’ refers to the process of determining 
the meaning of the words used; that process is traditionally thought to 
 
 116. Fausel v. JRJ Enters., Inc., 603 N.W.2d 612, 618 (Iowa 1999). 
 117. Hostmann v. First Interstate Bank of Ore. (In re XTI Xonix Techs. Inc.), 156 B.R. 
821, 829 n.6 (Bankr. D. Ore. 1993) (citing In re Union Trust Co., 151 N.Y.S. 246, 249 
(1915)). 
 118. Berg v. Hudesman, 801 P.2d 222, 226 (Wash. 1990) (en banc) (quoting 3 CORBIN, 
supra note 66, § 532, at 2, and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 200 (1981)). 
 119. Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. Voeltz, 431 N.W.2d 783, 785 (Iowa 1988) (citing 
Lonnie’s Const. Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. 227 N.W.2d 207, 210 (Iowa 1975)). 
 120. Joyner v. Adams, 361 S.E.2d 902, 905 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (quoting FARNSWORTH, 
supra note 87, § 7.11, at 500). 
 121. Allen v. Highway Equip. Co., 239 N.W.2d 135, 139 (Iowa 1976). 
 122. Ram Const. Co. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 749 F.2d 1049, 1053 (3d Cir. 1984). 
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be a function of the jury.  On the other hand, the process of 
determining the legal effect of the words used—once we know their 
meaning—is properly labeled ‘construction’; it is peculiarly a 
function of the court.”123 
 “Consequently [the will’s] meaning and her knowledge in respect to it 
are, in my opinion, relevant and admissible circumstances to throw 
light upon the interpretation of her will.  The construction or legal 
effect which New York law will attribute to the interpreted will is not 
under consideration at the moment.”124 
Not all courts distinguish between interpretation and construction, but the 
distinction is common in American case law.  As the quoted examples of 
actual usage by courts reflect, the distinction has been recognized by 
secondary authorities such as the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,125 
Arthur Corbin, Allan Farnsworth, John Wigmore, and Samuel Williston—
these are not eccentric or obscure authorities.  Garner and Scalia cite no 
primary authority, relying instead solely on secondary authorities William 
Like, H.T. Tiffany, and Robert J. Martineau126 for the demonstrably false 
proposition that the interpretation-construction distinction “never reflected 
the courts’ actual usage.”127 
Consider a final observation about Garner and Scalia’s critique of the 
interpretation-construction distinction.  The motivation for the critique is 
their objection to the idea that judges make law (rather than apply it).128  To 
that motivation, they implicitly add an assumption about constitutional 
construction:  they assume that construction must involve judicial discretion 
exercised on the basis of the judge’s beliefs about political morality (or 
policy and principle).  But that assumption is not entailed by the 
interpretation-construction distinction.  Garner and Scalia could adopt the 
distinction, but reject the notion that it creates room for judicial lawmaking 
in one of at least three ways.   
First, they could deny the existence of the construction zone—they could 
argue for a theory of strict construction and attempt to show that the 
communicative content of the constitutional text provides sufficient 
resources to resolve every possible constitutional controversy.  In other 
words, they could deny the existence of irreducible ambiguity, vagueness, 
gaps, and contradictions. 
Second, Scalia and Garner could adopt some version of Originalist 
Thayerianism—adopting a theory of construction that calls for deference to 
the political branches for cases within the construction zone.  Of course, 
they could also adopt a mixed strategy, arguing that the construction zone is 
 
 123. Williams v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 432 F.2d 165, 179 (5th Cir. 1970). 
 124. Chase Nat. Bank v. Chi. Title & Trust Co., 299 N.Y.S. 926, 937–38 (1934) (citing 5 
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2464 (2d ed. 1923)). 
 125. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 200 cmt. c & reporter’s note (1981). 
 126. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 15, at 15 nn.50–51. 
 127. Id. at 15 (emphasis added). 
 128. So far as I can tell, they do not say this explicitly, but it seems implicit in their 
discussion. See id. at 9–15. 
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relatively small and then calling for deference in the residual zone of 
constitutional underdeterminacy. 
Third, Scalia and Garner might allow for judicial decision in the 
construction zone that honors the Constraint Principle and resolves 
vagueness and irreducible ambiguity in ways that serve the purposes of 
particular constitutional provisions and the overall constitutional structure:  
of course, Scalia and Garner would limit the purposes to those fairly 
derived from text and history, and would exclude purposes warranted only 
by the moral and political beliefs of judges. 
Any one of these three alternatives has a real payoff for Scalia and 
Garner, because they clearly should object to the conflation of interpretation 
and construction.  That conflation is what allows nontextualists to argue 
that moral and prudential concerns are relevant to constitutional 
interpretation and hence to the “meaning” of the Constitution.129  Scalia and 
Garner have good reason to resist that kind of conflation and hence good 
reason to adopt the interpretation-construction distinction—even if they 
prefer to use different vocabulary.  There are, however, good and sufficient 
reasons (explored below130) to use the words “interpretation” and 
“construction” to describe the distinction; to the extent Scalia and Garner 
are persuaded by these reasons, they should withdraw both their substantive 
and their terminological objections to the interpretation-construction 
distinction. 
C.  The Persuasive-Definition Objection 
Andrew Coan has argued that the interpretation-construction distinction 
commits the fallacy of persuasive definition.131  I have responded to this 
objection elsewhere,132 so I will be brief.  The gist of the objection is that 
originalists are secretly using a stipulated definition (interpretation is the 
discovery of communicative content) to claim the rhetorical high ground:  
the word “interpretation” has positive associations (and “construction” 
presumably does not).  This objection would have some force if Coan’s 
description were accurate—but it simply is not.  First, originalists 
acknowledge that other terminology could be used to express the 
distinction, as I have done in this Article.  Second, the interpretation-
construction distinction is not some ruse, invented by originalists to deceive 
naïve citizens; it has a long history of use by courts and respected 
commentators.133  Third, even were this objection true, it would only justify 
 
 129. See supra notes 54–63 and accompanying text (discussing multiple modalities and 
plural methods of constitutional analysis). 
 130. See infra Part II.F.2. 
 131. See Andrew B. Coan, The Irrelevance of Writtenness in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1025, 1077–83 (2010). 
 132. See Solum, supra note 4, at 109–10. 
 133. See supra notes 1–2, 66–68, 116–24 and accompanying text; see also Joseph M. 
Perillo, UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts:  The Black Letter 
Text and a Review, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 281, 295 (1994) (“Legal theorists have long 
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a revision in terminology, not an abandonment of the fundamental 
conceptual and practical difference which the words “interpretation” and 
“construction” are used to mark.  Moreover, there are good reasons to prefer 
the words “interpretation” and “construction” as we shall soon see. 
D.  The Reduction of Meaning to Effect 
Consider another objection to the interpretation-construction distinction.  
That distinction rests on an underlying set of distinctions about 
communicative content (meaning), legal content (doctrine), and legal effect 
(decision).  One might argue that the meaning of a legal text just is the legal 
effect that the text produces.  For example, Roderick Hills writes, 
“pragmatically speaking, the meaning of a constitutional provision is its 
implementation.”134  If so, then construction swallows interpretation and 
the interpretation-construction distinction collapses.  Again, I have 
answered this objection elsewhere, so I will be brief.135 
The gist of the objection is based on the idea that legal texts do not have 
communicative content other than the effect they produce.  This objection is 
related to the legal realist version of the Aridity Objection considered 
earlier.136  The bad man doesn’t care about the meaning of the text; he cares 
only about the law in action.  That might be true, but the fact that bad men 
don’t care about communicative content doesn’t demonstrate that it does 
not exist.  Indeed, realist demonstrations that the law in action 
systematically differs from the law on the books assume that the law on the 
books has communicative content from which the law in action can differ.  
Moreover, legal practice in a variety of context only makes sense if we 
assume that communicative content exists.  So contract law has mandatory 
rules, which cannot be overridden by the communicative content of a 
contract, and default rules, that can be overridden.  The mandatory rules 
give the contract a different legal effect than it would have had if the 
communicative content controlled, and the default rules add legal content 
that isn’t present in the communicative content of the agreement.137 
Another way of demonstrating that interpretation and construction are not 
identical is by assuming two different perspectives on the distinction.  The 
first perspective is that of a judge—who must give the legal text legal 
effect.  From the judge’s perspective, it might be thought that 
 
distinguished between the interpretation of language (meaning) and its legal effect 
(construction).”). 
 134. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Pragmatist’s View of Constitutional Implementation and 
Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 173, 175 (2006). 
 135. Solum, supra note 4, at 111–14. 
 136. See supra Part II.A. 
 137. There is a large body of literature on default and mandatory rules in contract law. 
See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:  An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989); Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence:  
Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821 (1992); Lawrence B. Solum, 
The Boundaries of Legal Discourse and the Debate Over Default Rules in Contract Law, 3 
S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 311 (1993); Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules:  
Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703 (1999). 
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communicative content is only important insofar as it affects what the judge 
does—in other words, meaning only matters insofar as it produces legal 
effects.  The second perspective is that of the author of the legal text—the 
drafter of a contract, statute, or constitutional provision.  Authors of legal 
texts care about the communicative content of their writings.  From their 
perspective, it matters whether the judge acts in accord with the 
communicative content of the writing, or disregards it.  In many cases, 
authors of legal texts have purposes that will be frustrated if the 
communicative content is ignored.  From their perspective, the meaning of 
a text is not necessarily identical with its implementation.  For the authors 
of legal texts, this is a pragmatic concern and not a matter of theoretical 
nicety. 
In sum, communicative content does not collapse into legal content—and 
likewise the meaning of the constitutional text is not the same thing as the 
set of effects that the text produces. 
E.  Alternative Distinctions and Terminology 
The interpretation-construction distinction carves the conceptual space of 
constitutional practice at the joint between meaning (communicative 
content) and legal effect (including doctrinal content and adjudication).  
The terminology used to express the distinction, the terms “interpretation” 
and “construction,” could be used to express alternative carvings of 
conceptual space.  Supporters of the interpretation-construction distinction 
need not quarrel with these alternatives.  The claim that the interpretation-
construction distinction illuminates both constitutional practice and debates 
about originalism and living constitutionalism is not inconsistent with 
claims that other conceptual distinctions illuminate constitutional theory in 
different ways.  Communicative content can be distinguished from legal 
content, implementing rules, and the decision of particular cases—and we 
might slice things even more finely, differentiating the semantic and 
pragmatic components of communicative content and distinguishing 
various levels of constitutional doctrine from adjudicative rules, and so 
forth. 
Nonetheless, advocates of alternative distinctions may object to the 
interpretation-construction distinction.  Mitchell Berman accepts the 
conceptual distinction between communicative content and legal content:  
“Let’s start with the obvious:  court-announced constitutional doctrine is 
frequently not identical to the announcing court’s understanding of what the 
text of the Constitution means.”138  But Berman endorses neither the 
interpretation-construction distinction nor the terminology used to express 
it, emphasizing instead the distinction between “constitutional operative 
 
 138. Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Constructions and Constitutional Decision 
Rules:  Thoughts on the Carving of Implementation Space, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 39, 39 
(2010). 
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propositions” and “constitutional decision rules.”139  Similar points could 
be made about alternative distinctions, including Richard Fallon’s 
distinction between “constitutional interpretation” and “constitutional 
implementation.”140 
Berman also advances an affirmative argument for using the term 
“interpretation” to refer to the determination of legal content.  The core of 
his argument appears in the following passage: 
 We might say, for instance:  that judges must interpret legal texts to 
determine what the law is; that the point or function or purpose of legal 
interpretation is to ascertain what the law is; that the law is what 
authoritative legal texts, properly interpreted, provide or direct.  
Statements like these could be mistaken or misleading, but they are 
familiar and seem plausible on their face. 
 If this is right, then the target of legal interpretation is “legal meaning” 
or “legal content” or “law.”  We should not start by assuming that the 
target is “linguistic meaning” or “semantic content” even though it would 
turn out that way if “what the law is” is necessarily identical to the 
semantic meaning of the relevant legal texts.141 
Berman’s argument could be understood in various ways.  For example, he 
might be understood as making the following argument: 
Step One:  The term “interpretation” (in constitutional contexts) is 
commonly understood to refer to the determination of the legal content 
associated with a given legal text. 
Step Two:  Using the term “interpretation” to refer to the determination of 
linguistic meaning (communicative content) would therefore be 
misleading unless linguistic meaning is the sole determinate of legal 
content. 
Step Three:  The contention that linguistic meaning is the sole determinate 
of legal content is contested and therefore cannot be assumed by 
definition in discussions of constitutional theory. 
Conclusion:  Therefore, the term “interpretation” should not be used to 
refer to the determination of linguistic meaning in discussions of 
constitutional theory. 
If this reconstruction captures Berman’s point, then his argument is 
similar in structure to the persuasive-definition objection, discussed 
above.142  This is certainly an argument against using the word 
“interpretation” to refer to the discovery of linguistic meaning without any 
 
 139. Id. at 41; Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 
(2004). 
 140. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term—Foreword:  
Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54 (1997) (implicitly distinguishing 
“constitutional interpretation” from “constitutional implementation”); see also Berman, 
supra note 137, at 40 (glossing Fallon as distinguishing “constitutional interpretation” from 
“constitutional implementation”). 
 141. Berman, supra note 138, at 47–48. 
 142. See supra Part II.C. 
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explanation, but contemporary originalists are not guilty of deploying the 
interpretation-construction distinction without explanation.  Indeed, this 
Article is itself evidence that proponents of the interpretation-construction 
distinction go to great lengths to make the use of the term “interpretation” 
fully transparent. 
Moreover, the interpretation-construction distinction (however 
expressed) is necessary to avoid the conflation of communicative content 
and legal content.  Unless we draw the distinction between the activity of 
discovering communicative content and the activity of determining legal 
content, we will be unable to avoid conflating the two.  This point is 
explained above143 and summarized below.144 
In addition, drawing the interpretation-construction distinction does not 
smuggle in the controversial notion that “linguistic meaning is the sole 
determinate of legal content” (as contended in Step Three of the 
reconstructed argument).  The interpretation-construction distinction itself 
is neutral with respect to this claim.  When the distinction is combined with 
the further claim that the constitution creates substantial construction zones, 
the distinction forms part of a view that explicitly denies that 
communicative content is the sole determinant of legal content. 
Finally, there are reasons to believe that using “interpretation” as the term 
for the discovery of linguistic meaning is consistent with both general and 
legal usage.  One common meaning of the word “interpret” links it 
explicitly to meaning and its clarification.145  As discussed extensively 
above, there is a long history of legal usage of the term “interpretation” in 
the same sense as specified by the contemporary interpretation-construction 
distinction in constitutional theory.146  For this reason, the use of 
“interpretation” as the activity that refers to legal content can also be 
misleading.  Indeed, outside of the legal academy the use of the word 
“interpretation” to mean something other than the determination of meaning 
might itself be seen as a sort of verbal trickery—allowing judges to 
smuggle their views about contested moral and political questions into the 
“meaning” of the constitutional text. 
F.  Summarizing the Affirmative Case for 
the Interpretation-Construction Distinction 
The interpretation-construction distinction is an old one, with deep 
historical roots in American jurisprudence.  And the distinction has come to 
play an important role in contemporary constitutional theory.  But the 
distinction is still resisted, both substantively and on terminological 
grounds.  In light of the objections and answers that we have just 
 
 143. See supra Part II.A. 
 144. See infra Part II.F.1. 
 145. 7 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1131 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds., 2d ed. 
1989) (“[Interpret:  t]o expound the meaning of (something abstruse or mysterious); to 
render (words, writings, an author, etc.) clear or explicit; to elucidate; to explain.  Formerly, 
also, To translate (now only contextually, as included in the general sense).”). 
 146. See supra Part II.B. 
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considered, what is the affirmative case for the distinction and the 
vocabulary in which it is expressed? 
1.  The Distinction Is Essential for Conceptual Clarity 
The interpretation-construction distinction is essential for conceptual 
clarity in legal theory generally and constitutional theory in particular.  The 
alternative to drawing the distinction is to conflate communicative content 
and legal effect.  That conflation obscures real and important differences 
between the discovery of linguistic meaning and the determination of legal 
effect.  The linguistic meaning of the constitutional text is determined by 
linguistic facts and facts about the context of constitutional communication.  
In other words, the discovery of communicative content is a factual inquiry.  
The legal effect given to the constitutional text is determined by officials 
(especially judges) and institutions (especially courts).  This activity is 
essentially norm guided, although there may be a difference of opinion on 
whether the relevant norms are legal or moral in character. 
If we collapse the distinction between interpretation and construction, 
then we lack the conceptual apparatus to distinguish the respective roles of 
facts and norms in the enterprise.  On the one hand, we are at risk of a grave 
conceptual error—using normative considerations to determine linguistic 
meaning.  Put more plainly, conflating communicative content and legal 
content can lead us to believe that the text’s linguistic meaning is what we 
want it to be.  On the other hand, we are at risk of an equally serious 
mistake—assuming that there is an a priori and necessary connection 
between the communicative content of the text and its legal effect.  Put 
more plainly, collapsing the interpretation-construction distinction might 
lead some legal theorists to conclude that the communicative content 
automatically determines legal effect in a way that is immune to arguments 
about legal norms or political morality. 
Drawing the interpretation-construction distinction allows us to avoid 
these confusions.  It clearly distinguishes communicative content and legal 
effect.  This clear distinction allows us to theorize about the determination 
of linguistic meaning as a distinct step in legal practice.  And it allows us to 
address squarely the question as to what legal effect that meaning should be 
given.  Constitutional theory simply cannot do without the interpretation-
construction distinction. 
2.  The Words “Interpretation” and “Construction” Best Express the 
Distinction 
Even if the interpretation-construction distinction is necessary for clarity, 
it does not follow that we need to use the words “interpretation” and 
“construction” as the labels for these two distinct activities.  We could use 
other terms, perhaps “linguistic interpretation” and “legal construction” or 
“communicative-content interpretation” and “legal-content interpretation.”  
The distinction itself is essential, but the vocabulary is not—so long as 
clarity and precision are preserved. 
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Nonetheless, a strong case can be made for the use of the words 
“interpretation” and “construction” as labels for the concepts for which they 
stand.  Consider first the fact that these words have long been used to 
express the distinction—stretching back to the nineteenth century, 
continuing through the twentieth century (in usage by courts and legal 
scholars), and extending through the twenty-first century (in usage in 
contemporary constitutional theory and increasingly in other fields as well). 
If there were a well-established alternative vocabulary, then that 
vocabulary might be preferable.  But there is no such well-established 
alternative.  This means that it would become even more difficult to 
establish a working vocabulary for theorizing about the interpretation-
construction distinction if those terms were to be abandoned.  As it stands 
now, invocation of the interpretation-construction distinction has become a 
fairly standard move.  Once the distinction is invoked, readers and listeners 
are likely to understand that the terms are being used in a technical sense.  
Any residual uncertainty can easily be dispelled by an explanation of the 
distinction. 
The most significant objection to the language expressing the 
interpretation-construction distinction is the familiar usage of 
“interpretation” and “construction” as synonyms that refer to the whole 
process of discovering linguistic meaning, determining associated legal 
content, and devising implementing rules, and then applying the resulting 
norms to particular cases.  There is nothing intrinsically wrong with using 
either “interpretation” or “construction” in this way, but that way of talking 
invites the conceptual confusion that the interpretation-construction 
distinction dispels.  Moreover, this alternative usage is itself not uniform.  
For example, some theorists seem to want to reserve the term 
“interpretation” for the determination of legal content, which they 
distinguish from both implementing rules and application.147  And it seems 
clear that “interpretation” is frequently used in the sense specified by the 
interpretation-construction distinction—even by theorists who do not self-
consciously adopt the vocabulary expressing distinction. 
Devising a technical vocabulary always requires compromise.  One can 
choose neologisms—they purchase singularity of meaning at the price of 
obscurity, or one can use familiar terms with stipulated technical senses.  
The latter approach has been adopted for more than a century with respect 
to the interpretation-construction distinction.  On balance, this seems to be 
the best way to proceed, not because it is perfect, but because all of the 
alternatives seem worse.  As a practical matter it may simply be too late to 
switch terminological horses; the interpretation-construction distinction left 
the starting gate long ago. 
 
 147. See Berman, supra note 139; Fallon, supra note 140. 
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*  *  * 
With these preliminary objections out of the way, we can consider the 
two central claims advanced by this Article.  The first claim, addressed in 
Part III, is that construction is ubiquitous—constitutional practitioners 
always engage in constitutional construction when they apply the 
constitutional text to particular cases or problems.  The second claim, 
addressed in Part IV, is that the construction zone is ineliminable; there is 
no convincing argument that any plausible approach to constitutional 
interpretation will eliminate the underdetermination of constitutional 
practice by squeezing more communicative content from the constitutional 
text. 
III.  THE CASE FOR THE UBIQUITY OF CONSTRUCTION 
Construction is ubiquitous—it occurs whenever the constitutional text is 
given legal effect.  The core warrant for this claim is conceptual:  the 
meaning of “constitutional construction” in the cases and as stipulated by 
theorists is the activity of giving legal effect to the constitutional text.  This 
conceptual warrant can be clarified in two ways:  first, by giving a simple 
model (or rational reconstruction) of the process of constitutional 
construction, and second, by discussing the phenomenology of 
interpretation and construction. 
The process of constitutional interpretation and construction can be 
rationally reconstructed as two moments or steps in constitutional 
deliberation:148  call this “the two moments model of interpretation and 
construction” (or “the Two Moments Model” for short).  The Two 
Moments Model is a rational reconstruction:  the model does not purport to 
capture a uniform and invariant procedure actually followed by 
constitutional actors.  In the real world, constitutional deliberation can be 
messy—the judge may intuitively grasp the correct outcome without any 
conscious deliberation at all.  The Two Moments Model has interpretation 
before construction, but real judges might begin with construction, move 
back to interpretation, and then revise the construction—or do both more or 
less simultaneously. 
We can present the Two Moments Model as follows: 
Constitutional deliberation proceeds in two distinct moments (or steps): 
Step One:  Interpretation:  The deliberator parses the constitutional text 
and considers the relevant context, yielding a belief about the 
communicative content of the text. 
 
 148. Corbin suggested a version of the Two Moments Model when he stated, “The 
interpretation of communications is necessary as a preliminary to the determination of their 
legal operation or total lack of legal operation.” 3 CORBIN, supra note 66, § 534, at 11.  
James Ryan suggests a version of the Two Moments Model (in the context of “new 
textualism”), although he doesn’t use “interpretation” and “construction” to name the steps. 
See James E. Ryan, Laying Claim to the Constitution:  The Promise of New Textualism, 97 
VA. L. REV. 1523, 1544–45 (2011). 
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Step Two:  Construction:  The deliberator translates the communicative 
content of the constitutional text into the legal content of constitutional 
doctrine and applies that content to a constitutional choice situation (or 
case) thereby making a constitutional decision (or engaging in 
constitutional action). 
(The model is also diagrammed above.149)  The Two Moments Model 
represents the conceptual point that every constitutional decision or action 
involves interpretation and construction.  But because it is a rational 
reconstruction, the psychology or phenomenology of constitutional practice 
may be quite different.  How can we account for the possibility that judges 
and officials who engage in constitutional practice might report that they do 
not experience interpretation and construction as two distinct moments, or 
that they sometimes do not do construction at all? 
Before we turn to the phenomenology of constitutional deliberation, one 
preliminary point must be made.  Constitutional actors who are unfamiliar 
with the vocabulary and substance of the interpretation-construction 
distinction cannot be expected to engage in reliable reporting of their own 
deliberative processes in the technical vocabulary used in this Article.  Our 
exploration of the phenomenology of judging will utilize the device of two 
theoretically informed judges, Athena and Minerva, who are able to 
articulate their deliberations using the theoretical lexicon stipulated here. 
Imagine that Athena is presented with a constitutional issue in a case of 
first impression—indeed, the very rare case in which a court is called upon 
to interpret a provision of the Constitution that has not been interpreted by 
any prior court.  Let us imagine that Athena is presented with a case 
precipitated by an incident involving what appears to be a chemical 
weapon.  The U.S. Army forms part of the response, and the local 
commander requisitions a private home in the safe area adjacent to the zone 
contaminated by the incident:  the home is used as a command center and, 
because the incident is serious, some personnel take naps in the home rather 
than returning to their base at night.  No statute authorizes this action, but 
Congress did pass a general statute authorizing the “use of force” in 
connection with the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and 
the Pentagon.  The homeowner sues, and argues that this action violates the 
Third Amendment: 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the 
consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed 
by law.150 
Athena must decide whether the requisitioning of the home violates the 
prohibition against quartering soldiers.  Athena decides that it does, and 
makes the following report: 
When I thought about this case, I immediately saw that the action violated 
the Constitution and I issued the requested temporary restraining order by 
 
 149. See supra Figure 3. 
 150. U.S. CONST. amend. III. 
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signing the papers prepared by the clerk.  The meaning of the 
constitutional text was clear to me, so I did what was required.  I didn’t 
engage in any separate mental process of constitutional construction. 
Athena’s report is about the phenomenology of judging:  she reports her 
mental processes, which she experienced as involving interpretation (she 
grasped the meaning of the text), but not construction (she just issued the 
order).  Technically, the action of signing the order counts as 
construction—it gives the Third Amendment legal effect, but there was no 
experience of deliberation about this construction.  Athena had no 
conscious thought about alternative formulations of Third Amendment 
doctrines, such as a test for “quartering,” or “peace,” or “prescribed by 
law.”  Nonetheless, Athena did implicitly adopt a construction of the Third 
Amendment:  her decision presupposes a doctrine of constitutional law that 
corresponds to her understanding of the text—a strict construction of the 
Third Amendment.  The implicit presupposition was not part of her 
conscious experience:  the phenomenology does not track the rational 
reconstruction.  And, of course, she also engaged in “interpretation” as well; 
Athena had an understanding of the communicative content of the Third 
Amendment. 
Let us suppose that the United States appeals Athena’s decision to issue a 
temporary restraining order (TRO) to a motions panel of one of the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals.  The motions panel includes Minerva.  The government 
argues that the TRO should be vacated because the Army’s action was 
constitutional on two alternative theories:  First, if this is a time of peace, 
then the action was not “quartering” because the soldiers were not assigned 
to the home as a residence, and napping was only an occasional activity.  
Second, if this was a time of war, then the quartering was authorized by 
law.  Minerva reads the briefs, deliberates, and after consultation with her 
colleagues, the panel reverses the TRO.  Minerva reports her deliberation as 
follows: 
I saw that the case hinged on “quartering,” because if there was no 
“quartering,” then there was no violation, whether it was time of war or 
time of peace.  As a motions panel judge, I had to act quickly—there 
wasn’t time to do extensive historical research, but looking at dictionary 
definitions from the time and also some of the historical evidence of the 
usage of the word “quartering,” I realized that this was not an easy case.  
The house was not used for lodging; it was a command center.  But 
soldiers did sleep in the house.  This was a classic borderline case.  I 
decided that we needed to adopt some rule that resolved the vagueness of 
the word “quartering” and settled on a legal rule that quartering occurs 
only when soldiers regularly sleep in the house—not when they take 
irregular naps, but regularly sleep elsewhere.  My colleagues agreed.  
Once we had a rule, the rest was easy, and we issued the order reversing 
the TRO. 
Minerva reports deliberations that accord with the Two Moment Model.  
She first attempts to determine the communicative content of the Third 
Amendment.  This leads her to realize that “quartering” is the key term.  
She focuses on the semantics of quartering, and concludes that the word 
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“quartering” is vague in this context.  This completes the interpretive 
moment.  She then devises a rule of constitutional doctrine—a 
construction—and then applies that rule—another construction.  In 
Minerva’s case, the phenomenology tracks the rational reconstruction. 
The phenomenology of these two cases might suggest a misleading 
picture of the relationship between interpretation and construction, which 
we might call the “Alternative Methods Model.”  We might represent that 
picture as follows: 
FIGURE 5:  ALTERNATIVE METHODS MODEL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This model captures the fact that Athena and Minerva have different 
experiences of the decisionmaking process, but it is nonetheless inaccurate 
as a representation of the relationship between interpretation and 
construction.  Athena is unaware of the role that construction plays in her 
decision, but only because the construction she adopts is intuitively 
obvious, and hence not the object of conscious deliberation. 
The Two Moments Model is a rational reconstruction, but it better 
captures the conceptual relationship between interpretation and 
construction.  A more detailed version of the model was presented above,151 
but the point of the model can be presented simply: 
FIGURE 6:  TWO MOMENTS MODEL (SIMPLIFIED VERSION) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 151. See supra Figure 3. 
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In some cases, judges may attend only to interpretation (because 
construction seems obvious and intuitive).  In other cases, judges may focus 
entirely on construction; this is especially likely when an area of 
constitutional law involves a provision that is highly vague and abstract, or 
when case law provides a thick and complex body of constitutional 
doctrines.  In the former cases, construction may be tacit and unconscious, 
while in the latter cases, interpretation may be invisible. 
But in either case, construction occurs.  Ultimately, that is because 
constitutional construction is ubiquitous in constitutional practice.  It occurs 
whenever the Constitution is given legal effect. 
IV.  THE CASE FOR THE INELIMINABILITY OF THE CONSTRUCTION ZONE 
Because the constitutional text underdetermines legal effect, it creates a 
construction zone—a set of possible circumstances where the full 
communicative content of the constitutional text is consistent with more 
than one course of action.  The warrant for this claim is factual; to show the 
ineliminability of the construction zone, we need to examine the linguistic 
meaning of particular constitutional provisions and the circumstances to 
which these provisions might be applied.  We can begin with a general 
statement of the case for the existence and significance of the construction 
zone, and then proceed to a consideration of two important objections.152 
A.  The Affirmative Case for the Existence of the Construction Zone 
Construction is everywhere, but from that fact it does not follow that the 
communicative content of the constitutional text underdetermines the legal 
content of constitutional doctrine.  Recall that we are using the phrase 
“construction zone” to designate the set of possible cases in which the 
meaning of the text does not provide a determinate result.  Cases may fall 
into the construction zone for several reasons; we have identified four: 
 Irreducible ambiguity 
 Vagueness 
 Gaps 
 Contradictions 
For now, we shall focus on the possibility that the Constitution contains 
provisions that are vague, and therefore admit of borderline cases. 
For most of the discussion that follows, I will assume that vagueness is 
not just a problem of knowledge.  That is, I will be assuming that vagueness 
remains even with “perfect information” about linguistic facts and the state 
of the world.  In a footnote,153 I briefly explore what implications the 
 
 152. Keith Whittington has provided valuable discussion of the issues addressed in this 
section from a slightly different angle. See Whittington, supra note 72, at 121–34.  Many of 
the arguments made here are anticipated by Whittington. 
 153. Roy Sorensen, the prominent philosopher of language, has argued that all vagueness 
is epistemic. ROY SORENSEN, VAGUENESS AND CONTRADICTION (2001).  Putting aside 
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possibility that vagueness is epistemic all the way down could have for the 
construction zone.  But the epistemic theory of vagueness, as applied to 
legal rules, would result in the counterintuitive implication that all legal 
rules are actually razor-edged and precise bright line rules.  In part because 
of this counterintuitive implication of the epistemic theory of vagueness, we 
will now set it aside. 
We also need to distinguish between vagueness and generality.  Consider 
the following sequence of words and phrases: 
 Institutions 
 Political institutions 
 American political institutions 
 The Congress of the United States 
The set of institutions is more general than the set of political institutions, 
which in turn is more general than the set of American political institutions, 
which is more general than the Congress of the United States, which is a 
particular institution and not a general category at all.154 
A term can be quite general but not particularly vague.  The set of things 
that come in twos is vast.  But when the Constitution employs the very 
general and abstract term “two” in the provision that affords two Senators 
to each state, it does not thereby create vagueness.  Luckily, Senators come 
only in whole units; we never need to ask the question whether Senator 
Charles Schumer counts as only one Senator or whether his presence is so 
large that he should count as two.  But some general terms are also vague, 
so when the constitutional text employs a vague, abstract, and general term, 
it may create a substantial set of borderline cases. 
We can illustrate these ideas by considering the three power-granting 
provisions of the Constitution, contained at the beginning of the first three 
Articles. 
 
ambiguity, gaps, and contradictions, Sorenson’s suggestion would entail that every 
constitutional provision actually provides a bright-line rule that decides every possible case.  
But the fact that the bright line exists in theory does not entail that we can know where the 
bright line is located; the rule might remain vague for practical purposes because of our 
inability to know the exact location of the line it draws:  for this reason, the existence of a 
construction zone is consistent with the thesis that vagueness is epistemic in nature.  For 
practical purposes, epistemic vagueness creates a construction zone, since a line that courts 
cannot discover cannot operate directly to resolve disputes. 
 154. The distinction between the general and the particular and the idea that generality 
has degrees should be distinguished from the related distinction between the abstract and the 
concrete. See generally Gideon Rosen, Abstract Objects, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Mar. 
6, 2012), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/ (“Thus it is universally 
acknowledged that numbers and the other objects of pure mathematics are abstract (if they 
exist), whereas rocks and trees and human beings are concrete.  Some clear cases of 
abstracta are classes, propositions, concepts, the letter ‘A,’ and Dante’s Inferno.  Some clear 
cases of concreta are stars, protons, electromagnetic fields, the chalk tokens of the letter ‘A’ 
written on a certain blackboard, and James Joyce’s copy of Dante’s Inferno.”). 
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 Article I, Section One:  “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be 
vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a 
Senate and House of Representatives.”155 
 Article II, Section One, Clause One:  “The executive Power shall be 
vested in a President of the United States of America.”156 
 Article III, Section One:  “The judicial Power of the United States, 
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as 
the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”157 
The phrases “legislative powers,” “executive power,” and “judicial 
power” are general and vague.  Much of the generality of “legislative 
powers” is reduced by the specification in Clause Eight of Article I, which 
enumerates powers at a much less general level:  the power to establish 
postal roads is more particular (or less general) than “legislative power.”  
But neither Article II nor Article III provides an exhaustive enumeration of 
powers.  I will not provide the argument here, but it is at least plausible to 
believe that the constitutional scheme requires that we sort powers into the 
three categories.  Congress may not exercise executive or judicial powers 
(except insofar as the Senate participates in appointment of executive 
officers by advice and consent and ratifies treaties).  The federal courts may 
not exercise executive or legislative power, and the president may not 
exercise judicial or legislative powers (except through the veto).  Nothing 
important hangs on the correctness of this structural argument, which is 
introduced here solely for purposes of illustration. 
The three categories of power, at least on the surface, appear to be vague.  
There may be core instances of judicial power (trial of an action of trespass 
on the case), but other actions might be on the borderline between judicial 
and executive power (conducting an administrative hearing in a dispute 
between the government and a contractor over payments), or engaging in 
oversight of an executive agency.  Let us assume that each of the three 
categories has a core of determinate meaning and a penumbra of borderline 
cases.  The resulting picture might look something like this:   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 155. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 156. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
 157. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
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FIGURE 7:  LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, AND JUDICIAL POWER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Something like this picture seems to be assumed by Justice Robert 
Jackson’s well-known concurring opinion in the Steel Seizure158 case, 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer:  “When the President acts in 
absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only 
rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in 
which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its 
distribution is uncertain.”159  Justice Jackson’s twilight zone is simply the 
set of borderline cases between executive and judicial authority—the area 
that we are calling “the construction zone.” 
The Constitution employs a variety of words and phrases that seem to be 
vague.  Here are some: 
 “Freedom of speech” 
 “Free exercise of religion” 
 “Due process of law” 
 “Cruel and unusual punishment” 
 “Privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” 
And there are many others.  So, at least on the surface, it appears that 
several provisions of the Constitution create construction zones—where the 
communicative content of the constitutional text is vague and hence 
underdetermines at least some of the constitutional cases that might arise. 
Some originalists are worried about vagueness.  If one were attracted to 
originalism because one was opposed to unconstrained judicial discretion in 
constitutional cases, then the notion of a construction zone in which judicial 
decisions were unconstrained, and hence potential sites for the operation of 
 
 158. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring). 
 159. Id. at 637. 
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judicial discretion, would be worrisome.  And indeed, many originalists are 
resistant to both the interpretation-construction distinction and recognition 
of the existence of a construction zone.  They may acknowledge the 
existence of surface level vagueness but observe that appearances can be 
deceiving.  In the discussion that follows, we shall consider a variety of 
arguments against the existence and substantiality of the construction zone. 
B.  McGinnis and Rappaport’s Argument:  Original Methods Eliminate the 
Construction Zone 
One prominent argument against constitutional vagueness and irreducible 
constitutional ambiguity is that made by John McGinnis and Michael 
Rappaport in their article, Original Methods Originalism:  A New Theory of 
Interpretation and the Case Against Construction,160 and, subsequently, in 
The Abstract Meaning Fallacy.161  Their argument is complex and subtle, 
so I cannot do it full justice here.  Nonetheless, I hope that we can glean the 
gist of their argument.  Here is their statement of the core idea: 
Everyday language can be a slippery thing with ambiguous and vague 
meanings.  One important contribution of law is to create mechanisms to 
pin down meaning.  This enterprise helps generate more certainty and 
reduces the discretion of political officials, including judges, so that 
citizens can rely on norms around which to build their lives.  One of these 
mechanisms is to use legal meanings that have grown up around language 
that might otherwise seem abstract, general, or opaque to the ordinary 
reader.  Another is to resort to methods of legal interpretation which the 
law has developed to resolve ambiguity and vagueness.  Constitutional 
provisions are generally not created ex nihilo, but rather against the 
background of a complex and reticulated legal tradition which provides 
more information about their meaning than could be gleaned from a naïve 
reading of the text.162 
McGinnis and Rappaport make two distinct points in this passage.  The first 
point concerns “legal meanings,” or what I will call “terms of art.”  The 
second point is about the original methods of constitutional interpretation.  
Consider each point in turn. 
McGinnis and Rappaport correctly observe that legal texts can employ 
terms (or phrases) of art.  The general idea of a term of art was expressed by 
William Blackstone:  terms of art “must be taken according to the 
acceptation of the learned in each art, trade, and science.”163  The 
philosopher Hilary Putnam explains this phenomenon via the idea of a 
 
 160. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 45. 
 161. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Abstract Meaning Fallacy, 2012 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 737.  McGinnis and Rappaport may have used “abstract” for the concept that is 
sometimes called “generality.” See supra note 154 (discussing the difference between the 
general/particular distinction and the abstract/concrete distinction). 
 162. Id. at 750. 
 163. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *59–61. 
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division of linguistic labor.164  Terms of art have conventional semantic 
meanings in a linguistic subcommunity.  For example, the phrase “letters of 
marque and reprisal”165 might not have been familiar to the ordinary citizen 
or common human at the time the Constitution was drafted, ratified, and put 
into effect, but it might be that the linguistic subcommunity of seamen and 
admiralty lawyers had a very precise understanding of this phrase.166 
How can the use of a term of art eliminate vagueness?  Consider the 
phrase “due process of law”:  on the surface, that phrase seems vague or 
open textured.  Some procedures are in the core of due process—a jury trial 
governed by the rules of evidence.  Other procedures may be at the 
borderline—an after-the-fact hearing before an administrative tribunal.  But 
suppose that “due process of law” was a term of art that was understood by 
the linguistic subcommunity of persons learned in the law to refer to 
relatively specific features of the system of procedure provided by common 
law and equity in the late eighteenth century.  If there were no hearings by 
administrative tribunals in 1791, then that procedure would not be “due 
process of law.”  Likewise, it might be the case that the seemingly vague 
phrase “freedom of speech” was a phrase of art, understood by lawyers to 
refer to a specific rule—perhaps the rule against prior restraints.  Of course, 
terms of art can themselves be vague.  Thus, it might turn out that the 
eighteenth-century lawyers’ understanding of “due process of law” or 
“freedom of speech” admitted of borderline cases and hence was vague.  
Indeed, it is possible that a term that would not be vague in its ordinary 
meaning is vague for some linguistic subcommunity.  When a word or 
phrase has both an ordinary meaning and a technical meaning, there is no 
guarantee the meaning of the term of art is more precise than the 
conventional semantic meaning of the same word or phrase. 
McGinnis and Rappaport have identified a strategy that has the potential 
to reduce vagueness, but the proof must be in the pudding.  The technical 
meaning strategy must be applied case by case to each constitutional 
provision where the ordinary meaning is vague.  This would be a large 
undertaking—one that McGinnis and Rappaport have hardly begun, much 
less completed. 
McGinnis and Rappaport’s second strategy is rooted in their distinctive 
approach to originalist constitutional theory—Original Methods 
Originalism.  The basic idea is that the original meaning of the 
constitutional text is the meaning yielded by the methods of interpretation 
employed by lawyers and judges at the time each provision was framed and 
 
 164. The idea of a division of linguistic labor is usually attributed to Hilary Putnam. See 
Hilary Putnam, The Meaning of ‘Meaning,’ in 2 PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS:  MIND, LANGUAGE 
AND REALITY (1985); see also Mark Greenberg, Incomplete Understanding, Deference, and 
the Content of Thought (UCLA Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper 
Series, Research Paper No. 07-30, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1030144; 
Robert Ware, The Division of Linguistic Labor and Speaker Competence, 34 PHIL. STUD. 37 
(1978). 
 165. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 166. Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. 
REV. 923, 968 (2009). 
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ratified.  In the case of the Constitution of 1789 and the first ten 
amendments, the relevant methods would be those employed by late 
eighteenth century legal practice.  McGinnis and Rappaport assume that 
such methods will eliminate and reduce ambiguity and vagueness, and 
perhaps they are right.  But this conclusion cannot be guaranteed a priori, 
because it is at least possible that the original methods of interpretation do 
not precisify communicative content.  Original Methods Originalism is at 
an early stage of development; McGinnis and Rappaport have not yet 
produced a catalog of original methods corresponding to the period in 
which each provision of the Constitution was framed and ratified.  Indeed, 
there is no work that provides a comprehensive history of legal 
interpretation in the United States.167 
Nonetheless, there are reasons to doubt that the original methods of 
interpretation will always yield precisification.  Consider a sample of early 
cases, with particular attention to the italicized passages: 
 Board v. Cronk, 1822:  “It is true, that in construing a recent statute, 
ambiguously or obscurely drawn, courts will go a great way to give it 
that construction which will best effect the manifest intent of the 
legislature, and be most conducive to the public good and the public 
convenience; but where a statute has already received its construction, 
and where the practice under it has been uniform for fifty years and 
more, and so become the settled law of the land, it would be going a 
great way for a court to give it a new construction under the pretence 
of making it better.”168 
 Greenhow v. Buck, 1816:  “Where the words of a Statute are 
ambiguous, the general intent must be considered.  The general intent 
of the Legislature, in this case, was to establish equality.  Injustice 
must be done, if the Act is to be construed, as Mr. Leigh contends.  
The question then is, are the words so plain as to be capable of no 
other construction, than that leading to this injustice?”169 
 Braxton v. Winslow, 1791:  “It is a rule of construction, that where a 
statute is ambiguously worded, Courts will be governed by arguments 
drawn from inconvenience:  and will pursue the equity of the case 
arising under the statute.”170 
“Conducive to the public good,” “public convenience,” “general intent,” 
“equality,” “injustice,” “inconvenience,” and “equity of the case”—it is not 
clear that considerations of these factors will lead to precisification.  Indeed, 
these words and phrases seem to be paradigms of terms with borderline 
cases, and, moreover, they are terms that invite consideration of principle 
and policy. 
Of course, this abbreviated discussion is hardly sufficient to establish that 
the original methods of constitutional interpretation and construction are 
 
 167. See William S. Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation:  A Study in Form and 
Substance, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 799, 799 (1985). 
 168. Board v. Cronk, 6 N.J.L. 119, 120 (1822) (emphasis added). 
 169. Greenhow v. Buck, 19 Va. (5 Munf.) 263, 272 (1816) (emphasis added). 
 170. Braxton v. Winslow, 1 Va. (1 Wash.) 31, 32 (1791) (emphasis added). 
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insufficient to precisify vague or ambiguous constitutional language:  in 
order to establish that conclusion, we would need to reconstruct the original 
method for a particular period and then demonstrate that there are cases of 
constitutional vagueness or ambiguity that the method does not precisify.  
Likewise, for McGinnis and Rappaport to demonstrate that the original 
methods eliminate the construction zone, they would need to produce the 
original methods and then demonstrate that they do, in fact, resolve 
ambiguity and vagueness for each and every provision of the Constitution 
governed by that method. 
McGinnis and Rappaport acknowledge the possibility that vagueness or 
ambiguity might remain after the original methods of constitutional 
interpretation are applied: 
It is theoretically possible that the interpretive rules may not resolve every 
uncertainty, especially uncertainty resulting from vagueness.  We have 
argued that such uncertainties are unlikely if the interpretive rules require 
interpreters to choose the meaning that is more likely, even if other 
meanings are possible.  But if there is a remaining uncertainty, then one 
might be in a situation involving construction, where the original meaning 
does not provide an answer.171 
To be sure, McGinnis and Rappaport have only conceded that this is a 
theoretical possibility, but the force of this concession is nonetheless 
important, because it explicitly recognizes that the existence and size of the 
construction zone is an empirical question to be resolved by inquiry into the 
content of the original methods and their effect on particular provisions of 
the Constitution.  I believe that it is fair to conclude that there is (at least) 
substantial uncertainty about the best answer to this question—assuming 
that historical inquiry yields a single and determinate original method for 
each of the relevant historical periods.172 
Consider another issue raised by McGinnis and Rappaport’s remarks 
quoted above.173  They formulate the question as if it were, “Is there any 
need for constitutional construction at all?” and answer that construction 
may be unnecessary.  That articulation assumes the Alternative Methods 
Model, presented in Figure 5, above.174  Given the conception of 
constitutional construction offered here, the substance of their claim is not 
that there is no construction, because construction always occurs when the 
 
 171. Id. at 752 n.54. 
 172. I believe that McGinnis and Rappaport’s theory implies that the relevant “original 
method” is the method in force at the time each provision of the Constitution is framed and 
ratified.  Thus, for the Bill of Rights and the Constitution of 1789, the relevant method is that 
which prevailed in the eighteenth century, but for the Reconstruction Amendments, the 
relevant original methods would be those that prevailed in the mid-nineteenth century.  They 
might be the same, but there are reasons to believe they are not. See Blatt, supra note 167.  It 
is possible that McGinnis and Rappaport would argue that the original methods are frozen in 
time as of 1789, but then their argument cannot be that the drafters and ratifiers would have 
understood the amendments in that way—unless it can be shown that they had explicitly or 
implicitly adopted a frozen version of Original Methods Originalism. 
 173. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
 174. See supra Figure 5. 
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Constitution simply is the determination of legal effect.  Rather, their real 
point is about the construction zone.  Their reconstructed position is that the 
construction zone may not exist at all, but that it is theoretically possible 
that there is some small set of cases where the original methods of 
interpretation and construction are insufficient to precisify or disambiguate 
some provisions of the Constitution. 
In addition, there is a conceptual difficulty with McGinnis and 
Rappaport’s position.  They present their theory as a theory of 
constitutional “interpretation” and not one of “construction”—in the sense 
those terms are used here and in the cases cited above.175  We might think 
of the original methods as a set of “canons” (rules, standards, or 
principles176) that govern constitutional practice.  The original methods 
might be comprised of canons of interpretation, canons of construction, or a 
mixed set of canons of construction and interpretation.  Because we don’t 
have a list of the canons associated with the original methods, it is not clear 
exactly how each of them should be categorized.  But if we consider 
modern canons (by way of analogy) it is clear that we find both kinds.  
Some of the modern canons are rules of thumb—they help us to identify 
salient patterns in statutory language and enable us to discern 
communicative content.177  Other modern canons are substantive—they 
determine the legal effect (and not the linguistic meaning) of the text.178 
 
 175. See supra notes 116–24 and accompanying text. 
 176. See Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 026:  Rules, Standards, and 
Principles, LEGAL THEORY LEXICON, http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/
2004/03/legal_theory_le_3.html (last updated Aug. 18, 2013). 
 177. James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest 
for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 12 (2005) (“Language canons consist of 
predictive guidelines as to what the legislature likely meant based on its choice of certain 
words rather than others, or its grammatical configuration of those words in a given 
sentence, or the relationship between those words and text found in other parts of the same 
statute or in similar statutes.  These canons do not purport to convey a judge’s own policy 
preferences, but rather to give effect to “ordinary” or “common” meaning of the language 
enacted by the legislature, which in turn is understood to promote the actual or constructive 
intent of the legislature that enacted such language.”).  This description of “language 
canons” strongly suggests that they are canons of “interpretation” in the sense in which 
interpretation is distinguished from construction. 
 178. See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. 
REV. 109, 109–10 (2010) (“Federal courts have long employed substantive canons of 
construction to interpret federal statutes.  Some substantive canons express a rule of thumb 
for choosing between equally plausible interpretations of ambiguous text.  The rule of lenity 
is often described this way:  it directs that courts interpret ambiguous penal statutes in favor 
of the defendant.  Other canons are more aggressive, permitting a court to forgo a statute’s 
most natural interpretation in favor of a less plausible one more protective of a particular 
value.  For example, a court will strain the text of a statute to avoid deciding a serious 
constitutional question, and absent a clear statement, it will not interpret an otherwise 
unqualified statute to subject either the federal government or the states to suit.  While courts 
and commentators sometimes seek to rationalize these and other substantive canons as 
proxies for congressional intent, it is generally recognized that substantive canons advance 
policies independent of those expressed in the statute.”).  Barrett uses the words 
“construction” and “interpretation” interchangeably, but her description of substantive 
canons makes it clear that they control legal effect and do not seek meaning. 
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Scalia and Garner’s recent classification of the canons marks the 
distinction between principles that apply to all texts and those that apply to 
governmental actions.179  Most (or all) of the canons that they label 
“semantic,” “syntactical,” and “contextual” are actually canons of 
interpretation, as is evident from the following examples: 
 “Words are to be understood in their ordinary, everyday meanings—
unless the context indicates that they bear a technical sense.”180 
 “And joins a conjunctive list, or a disjunctive list—but with negatives, 
plurals, and various specific wordings there are nuances.”181 
These canons of interpretation summarize linguistic facts.  The word “and” 
is used for conjunctive lists; the word “or” is used for disjunctive lists.  The 
canon is a rule of thumb that identifies a common linguistic practice. 
The canons of interpretation can be contrasted with other canons that 
determine the legal effect—canons of construction.182  Examples from 
Scalia and Garner include the following: 
 “A statute should be interpreted in a way that avoids placing its 
constitutionality in doubt.”183 
 “The legislature cannot derogate from its own authority or the 
authority of its successors.”184 
These canons of construction report rules of law.  A legislature is not 
legally empowered to alienate its authority, even if it tries to do so through 
unambiguous language.  In this case, the tipoff is the word “cannot,” which 
in this context signals legal effect not communicative content. 
The original methods of constitutional interpretation are likely to include 
both canons of interpretation and canons of construction, but this poses a 
serious problem for McGinnis and Rapport’s attempt to eliminate (or all but 
eliminate) the construction zone.  The existence of canons of construction is 
evidence for the existence of the construction zone.  Thus, in each of the 
early cases discussed above, the most natural explanation for the language 
used in the opinions is that the court was engaged in constitutional 
construction.  Recall the key operative terms: 
 “Conducive to the public good” 
 “Public convenience” 
 “General intent” 
 “Equality” 
 
 179. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 16, at x–xvii. 
 180. Id. at 69. 
 181. Id. at 116. 
 182. Abbe Gluck has recently explored the idea that some canons of “interpretation” (in 
the broad sense that includes both interpretation and construction) operate as rules of law. 
See Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation:  Erie for the Age 
of Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 753 (2013). 
 183. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 16, at 247. 
 184. Id. at 278. 
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 “Injustice” 
 “Inconvenience” 
 “Equity of the case” 
This is the language of determining legal effect (not meaning) and hence of 
construction. 
McGinnis and Rappaport have an ingenious argument that the original 
methods all go to linguistic meaning or communicative content.  Here is 
their statement of the argument: 
Originalists—both of the original intent and original meaning variety—
argue that modern interpreters should be guided by the word meanings 
and rules of grammar that existed when the Constitution was enacted.  But 
word meanings and grammatical rules do not exhaust the historical 
material relevant to constitutional interpretation.  There are also 
interpretive rules, defined as rules that provide guidance on how to 
interpret the language in a document.  It is our position that originalism 
requires modern interpreters to follow the original interpretive rules used 
by the enactors of the Constitution as much as the original word meanings 
or rules of grammar.185 
This argument is clever—McGinnis and Rappaport argue that canons of 
interpretation and construction constitute a legal grammar and syntax, and 
hence that they determine the communicative content of the constitutional 
text. 
Moreover, they may be right about some interpretive rules.  Consider the 
following example from Scalia and Garner:  “In the absence of a contrary 
indication, the masculine includes the feminine (and vice versa) and the 
singular includes the plural (and vice versa).”186 
If such a rule were part of the publicly available context of constitutional 
communication, and if the Constitution used language governed by the rule, 
then the communicative content of the Constitution would be the content 
yielded by application of the rule to the text—and not the conventional 
semantic meaning that the same words would have in contexts in which the 
rule was not common knowledge of authors and readers.  Theoretically, this 
would be contextual enrichment; the canons of interpretation are part of the 
context of communication and hence can enhance the semantic content of 
the text. 
 The Constitution of 1789 employs “he” in several places, for example:  
“No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age 
of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, 
and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he 
shall be chosen.”187  Suppose that general linguistic practice was not to use 
“he” to mean “he or she,” but that there was a gender canon, such that use 
of “he” in legal documents was understood to mean “he or she.”  It would 
 
 185. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 45, at 756. 
 186. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 16, at 129. 
 187. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
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then follow that the use of “he” does not limit the effect of the clause 
quoted above to males.  (All of this is hypothetical; it is quite possible that 
general linguistic practice would interpret “he” as he or she in 1789.) 
The fact that some of the original methods operate like rules of syntax 
and grammar does not entail that all of them work this way.  Substantive 
canons are canons of construction—they determine legal effect and not 
linguistic meaning. 
So McGinnis and Rappaport’s claim that canons of interpretation and 
construction function like rules of grammar and syntax is correct as applied 
to some of the canons, but not all.  Some canons are legal rules of 
construction—they determine legal effect.  To the extent that the original 
methods include canons of construction, the original methods are methods 
of construction.  Because we currently lack a fully developed set of original 
methods, it is difficult to judge the extent to which the set includes canons 
of construction, but we have good reason to believe that at least some of the 
original methods involve construction.  Moreover, to the extent that these 
methods resolve irreducible ambiguity or vagueness by considering factors 
like “conducive to the public good,” “public convenience,” “general intent,” 
“equality,” “injustice,” “inconvenience,” and “equity of the case,” the 
original methods will yield constructions and not interpretations. 
There is a further problem with the claim that the original methods of 
constitutional interpretation and construction liquidate any surface problems 
of ambiguity, vagueness, gaps, or contradiction.  The theory assumes that 
the authors of the relevant constitutional texts were aware of the original 
methods and hence that they could deploy the original methods to create 
communicative content.  But this is an empirical hypothesis; let us call this 
claim the “knowledge of original methods hypothesis” or the “Knowledge 
Hypothesis” for short.  It is not clear that the Knowledge Hypothesis will be 
vindicated by empirical investigation.  This question has been studied in the 
contemporary context and the results are not promising for the Knowledge 
Hypothesis.  In a recent study by Abbe Gluck and Lisa Bressman, the 
results suggest that congressional staffers have, at best, imperfect 
knowledge of the canons of statutory interpretation and construction.188 
The circumstances of constitutional communication seem, at least on the 
surface, to be less favorable than the circumstances of contemporary 
legislation for the confirmation of the Knowledge Hypothesis.  First, with 
respect to the Constitution of 1789, it is not clear that the content of the 
original methods were settled.  Although there were state constitutions, it is 
not clear that the methods of constitutional interpretation at the state level 
were clear and fixed.  Methods of statutory interpretation also existed, but it 
is not clear whether the content of these methods was unitary, clear, and 
 
 188. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—
An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons:  Part I, 65 
STAN. L. REV. 901 (2013).  The relevance of Gluck and Bressman’s work was suggested by 
John Ohlendorf. 
2013]  CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 511 
fixed.189  Second, the mechanisms for transmission of the original methods 
to the Framers may have been primitive by contemporary standards.  Case 
reports may not have been universally available, and secondary materials 
were limited in scope.  Third, whereas the contemporary Congress has a 
large professional staff, many members of which have legal training and 
experience, the original Constitution was drafted a mixed group with varied 
knowledge of the law and without anything like a professional research 
staff. 
One way to conceptualize the question whether the original methods of 
interpretation and construction determine the communicative content of the 
Constitution is to conduct a thought experiment.  Consider the possible 
world in which the original Constitution contained an additional 
provision:190 
Article VIII:  When interpreting this Constitution, citizens, officials, and 
judges shall give its provisions that meaning its provisions would now 
have after application of the currently prevailing methods of legal 
interpretation and construction in the United States.  Words and phrases 
shall be given their legal meaning, even when that meaning is different 
than their ordinary meaning. 
Original Methods Originalism advances the claim that the Constitution 
contains an implicit Article VIII.  Even if the original methods could 
produce a fully determinate set of constitutional doctrines, it is hardly clear 
that the Constitution does contain the implicit equivalent of Article VIII.  If 
it does not, then Original Methods Originalism does not provide a 
comprehensive theory of the communicative content of the Constitution. 
C.  The Lawson-Paulsen Argument That Constitutional Default Rules Can 
Eliminate the Necessity of Construction 
We have already considered the possibility that originalists might adopt a 
principle of deference to democratic decisionmaking.  The basic idea is 
simple:  if the constitutional text underdetermines the result in a particular 
case, then judges should defer to legislatures and executive officials.  The 
idea of a Thayerian approach to constitutional construction was introduced 
above in the form of the Originalist Thayerian Theory.191  The earlier 
discussion focused on a simplified view for the purpose of illustration.  We 
are now investigating a more fully developed version of Originalist 
 
 189. Bernadette Meyler’s work is suggestive in this regard.  She writes, “Common law 
originalism regards the strands of eighteenth-century common law not as providing 
determinate answers that fix the meaning of particular constitutional clauses but instead as 
supplying the terms of a debate about certain concepts, framing questions for judges but 
refusing to settle them definitively.” Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law 
Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 551, 551–58 (2006).  Meyler is writing about the common 
law, but it is at least possible that the situation regarding eighteenth-century methods of 
interpretation is similar. 
 190. This thought experiment was suggested by Gary Lawson.  Lawson himself 
introduced a slightly different thought experiment using the “Article VIII” device in a recent 
article. See Gary Lawson, Dead Document Walking, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1225, 1234 (2012). 
 191. See supra Part I.C. 
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Thayerianism, which can be understood in two very different ways:  (1) as 
an interpretation of the constitutional text, or (2) as a principle of 
construction that applies when the text underdetermines constitutional 
doctrine or outcomes.  Viewed as a principle of construction, Originalist 
Thayerianism is entirely consistent with the existence of the construction 
zone.  But if the constitution itself requires deference in cases that would 
(otherwise) be underdetermined by the meaning of the text, then the full 
meaning of the text eliminates the construction zone. 
No contemporary constitutional theorist explicitly advocates that 
Originalist Thayerianism eliminates the need for constitutional 
construction, but Gary Lawson and Michael Paulsen have argued that 
constitutional interpretation yields constitutional default rules and that these 
rules can eliminate the need to resort to constitutional construction.  I will 
use Lawson and Paulsen’s arguments as the basis for my own sketch of a 
version of Originalist Thayerianism.  In the discussion that follows, I will 
offer some arguments against the actual positions offered by Lawson and 
Paulsen, but the primary purpose of my arguments here is to illustrate the 
difficulty of avoiding constitutional construction on the basis of default 
rules in general, and a default rule of deference to democratic institutions in 
particular.  To the extent that neither Lawson nor Paulsen embraces 
Originalist Thayerianism as described here, this discussion does not directly 
apply to their views. 
Lawson and Paulsen have distinct theories—although there are important 
resemblances between them.  Consider Lawson first. 
1.  Lawson’s Proposal for Transforming Epistemological 
Uncertainty into Adjudicative Certainty 
Gary Lawson argues against the need for constitutional construction.  His 
argument begins with the premise that uncertainty about the application of a 
vague or ambiguous constitutional provision is epistemic in nature.  
(Epistemic uncertainty is uncertainty about what we know.192)  Thus, he 
writes:  “In adjudication, one does not need epistemological certainty in 
order to achieve adjudicative determinacy.  One only needs the appropriate 
standards of proof and burdens of proof that, together, determine who wins 
and loses when the epistemological answer is ‘beats me.’”193  Lawson is 
right.  Burdens of production and persuasion (or less precisely, “burdens of 
proof”) can provide a mechanism for translating epistemic uncertainty into 
certain decision.  He then proposes that in the absence of certainty, 
constitutional cases should be decided so as to defer to democratic 
decisionmaking: 
 I want to dissent from the originalist construction project and declare 
the Constitution a “no-construction zone.”  In adjudicative theory, one 
 
 192. For an extended discussion of the role of epistemic uncertainty in interpretation and 
construction, see Heidi Kitrosser, Interpretive Modesty (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with author). 
 193. Lawson, supra note 190, at 1233. 
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does not need construction to deal with interpretative uncertainty because 
there is an interpretative answer to interpretative uncertainty in 
adjudication. 
 . . . . 
 In the event that there is any uncertainty about what this Constitution 
means in any specific application, resolve the uncertainty against the 
existence of federal power and in favor of the existence of state power.  In 
other words, presume that state laws and acts are constitutional unless 
something in this Constitution convinces you otherwise and presume that 
federal laws and acts are unconstitutional unless something in this 
Constitution convinces you otherwise.194 
We can think of Lawson’s strategy in terms of constitutional default rules 
that govern constitutional questions unless the meaning of the constitutional 
text clearly requires some other action.195 
Lawson characterizes his default rules as “interpretive,” but he is not 
using the word “interpretation” (and its variants) in the sense specified by 
the interpretation-construction distinction as it is presented here and used in 
the American case law.196  Lawson’s default rules do not determine the 
communicative content (or meaning) of the text; instead, they are rules of 
law that give the text legal effect when the meaning is uncertain—as 
Lawson says, these are rules for the determination of legal effect.  In other 
words, Lawson’s default rules are best viewed as rules of construction.  
Nonetheless, Lawson may believe that his default rules are contained in the 
communicative content of the constitutional text; the case against the claim 
that Originalist Thayerianism as a constitutional interpretation is explored 
in greater depth below.197 
Lawson has articulated a distinction between “interpretation” and 
“adjudication,”198 but his distinction is actually a version of the 
interpretation-construction distinction.  In a more recent paper, Lawson 
articulates the distinction this way: 
Originalism-as-interpretation is a theory of meaning; originalism-as-
adjudication is a theory of action.  Theories of meaning are evaluated by 
reference to positive criteria of accuracy in discerning communicative 
signals; theories of action are evaluated by reference to normative criteria 
of justice.199 
Translating Lawson’s point into the terminology of the interpretation-
construction distinction, Lawson’s “originalism-as-interpretation” 
corresponds precisely to “interpretation” as that term is used here.  
Lawson’s “originalism-as-adjudication” is closely related to “construction,” 
 
 194. Id. at 1233–34. 
 195. On the idea of a default rule, see Solum, supra note 137. 
 196. See supra notes 116–24 and accompanying text. 
 197. See infra Part IV.C.3. 
 198. See Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823, 
1823 (1997). 
 199. See Gary Lawson, Originalism Without Obligation, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1309, 1313 
(2013). 
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although construction includes constitutional practice outside the courts, 
including constitutional construction by nonjudicial officials and citizens.  
But Lawson’s larger point is exactly right:  originalist interpretation is a 
theory of communicative content (meaning) and originalist construction is a 
theory of action (legal effect).  So, Lawson does not want argue that the 
Constitution is a “no adjudication zone.”  And his articulated views 
embrace the substance of the interpretation-construction distinction 
although he articulates this substance in a different vocabulary. 
Lawson’s discussion of construction assumes the Alternative Methods 
Model200 of the interpretation-construction distinction, but that model 
captures only an accidental psychological or phenomenological feature of 
interpretation and construction.  Once we reconstruct his position in terms 
of the Two Moments Model,201 it becomes clear that Lawson’s conclusion 
is not that the Constitution is a “no construction zone.”  Quite the opposite, 
he has demonstrated the existence of the construction zone and proposed a 
method for constitutional construction (“standards of proof and burdens of 
proof”) that eliminate judicial discretion and judicial decision on the basis 
of principle or policy.  Thus, we might restate his position as, “The 
constitutional construction zone should be a no discretion zone.” 
One final caveat concerning Lawson.  The above discussion is based on 
my reconstruction of Lawson’s complex, sophisticated, and nuanced views.  
The main point of the discussion is to make it clear that Lawson’s position 
is consistent with the interpretation-construction distinction, but I have not 
attempted to provide a full statement of Lawson’s own views about 
constitutional interpretation. 
2.  Paulsen’s Argument That the Constitution Prescribes Its Own 
Rules of Interpretation 
Michael Paulsen has offered a slightly different case for a version of 
Originalist Thayerianism in his article entitled, Does the Constitution 
Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?202  But before we consider his 
argument, it should be observed that Paulsen believes that some 
constitutional provisions do require construction, as evidenced by the 
following passage: 
Constitutional provisions do not “stand for” abstract principles; they 
“stand for” what they say.  Sometimes the words state bright-line rules, 
like the thirty-five years of age requirement.  Sometimes they state 
standards that may call for judgment by some relevant decisionmaker, as 
with “unreasonable” searches or “cruel and unusual” punishment or 
“excessive” fines.203 
 
 200. See supra Figure 5. 
 201. See supra Figure 3. 
 202. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own 
Interpretation?, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 857 (2009). 
 203. Id. at 881. 
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If Paulsen is correct about the meaning of these provisions, then he has 
made the case for the existence of the construction zone—at least with 
respect to three constitutional provisions. 
But with respect to other constitutional provisions, Paulsen argues for a 
version of what I call Originalist Thayerianism.  Here is his statement of the 
argument: 
What should one do with such an unspecific text?  Robert Bork’s famous 
reply was that the interpreter should treat such a provision as one would 
an inkblot.  A somewhat improved answer might be that the 
Constitution’s text itself suggests, as a practical matter, a default rule of 
interpretation where the constitutional text is unspecific:  popular 
republican self-government.  The more specific a text (like the thirty-five-
year-old requirement), the more it will limit democratic choice with 
respect to the rule specified.  The more unspecific a text, the more room it 
leaves for democratic choice, in accordance with the structures of 
government the Constitution creates at the federal level and mostly leaves 
alone at the state level.  If the Constitution’s text supplies no rule or 
standard governing the issue in question, the issue defaults to some other 
source of law or the designated authority of some decisionmaker who 
otherwise possesses policy discretion with respect to that issue.  Where 
the document’s broad or unspecific language admits of a range of possible 
actions, consistent with the language, government action falling within 
that range is not unconstitutional.204 
On the surface, it appears that Paulsen has eliminated the construction zone 
(outside of the cases in which the text itself mandates construction). 
Not so fast.  The core of Paulsen’s argument is that “the Constitution’s 
text itself suggests . . . a default rule of . . . popular republican self-
government.”  The word “suggests” is revealing:  Paulsen does not argue 
that the default rule is explicitly stated by the text.  There is nothing about 
default rules in the text, and the only appearance of the word “republican” is 
in Article IV:  “The United States shall guarantee to every State in this 
Union a Republican Form of Government.”205  The default rule that Paulsen 
proposes is not stated in the Guarantee Clause—nor does this default rule 
appear via contextual enrichment of the semantic content of that clause.  
For these reasons, it seems dubious that Paulsen could establish that his 
default rule is an interpretation of the constitutional text.  This does not 
mean that the default rule is unconnected to the text:  for example, Paulsen 
can argue that the normative commitments reflected in the text support his 
Thayerian default rule. 
Paulsen’s default rule is actually a rule of constitutional construction.  
When the constitutional text is “unspecific” (e.g., vague or irreducibly 
ambiguous), we apply a default rule of construction that determines the 
legal effect of the vague language.  The meaning is vague, but the legal 
effect is made specific via the default rule.  Paulsen’s argument does not 
eliminate the construction zone.  For Paulsen, the work of constitutional 
 
 204. Id. at 881–82. 
 205. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
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construction is done by a normative principle (deference to democratic 
decisions).  One last clarification is important:  even if Paulsen’s default 
rule is not part of the meaning of the constitutional text, it might be that it is 
supported by our understanding of constitutional purposes or values, and 
hence it could be a “constitutional principle” in that sense.  As with 
Lawson, Paulsen seems to believe that his principle of deference is required 
by the constitutional text:  this possibility is considered immediately 
below.206 
One final observation about both Paulsen’s and Lawson’s arguments:  
they both rely on the notion of a default rule (of deference to democratic 
institutions).  But default rules are paradigm cases of rules of construction.  
The whole idea of a default rule is to determine legal effect when the 
meaning of the text runs out.  The passages from Farnsworth that serve as 
the epigraph for this Article provide a particularly clear demonstration of 
exactly this point.207 
3.  Is Originalist Thayerianism Required by Interpretation 
of the Constitutional Text? 
Both Lawson and Paulsen believe that their constitutional default rules 
are required by the constitutional text itself and hence do not accept the 
characterization of their methods for resolving constitutional 
underdeterminacy as methods of constitutional construction.  This 
subsection addresses the question whether public meaning originalism can 
embrace this claim.  The answer developed here is no—a principle of 
deference to the political branches in cases involving constitutional 
underdeterminacy cannot be derived from the text.  The argument 
supporting this position will proceed in stages, beginning with the explicit 
semantic content of the constitutional text. 
a.  Thayerian Deference Is Not Explicitly Required by the 
Semantic Content of the Constitutional Text 
The semantic content of the constitutional text does not contain an 
explicit principle of deference to the political branches in cases where the 
constitutional text is vague, irreducibly ambiguous, or underdeterminate for 
some other reason.  The warrant for this conclusion is obvious:  there is no 
deference clause in the text.  There are constitutional provisions that govern 
constitutional construction—for example, the Ninth Amendment provides, 
“The enumeration of certain rights in this constitution shall not be construed 
to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”  But there is no clause 
that says, “This Constitution shall not be construed to invalidate state or 
federal laws or acts unless the text clearly requires that result,” or “This 
Constitution shall be construed to require deference to Congress, the 
president, and the executives and legislatures of the several states in any 
 
 206. See infra Part IV.C.3. 
 207. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. 
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case in which its provisions do not clearly require invalidation of their 
actions.” 
Of course, the fact that the Constitution’s semantic content does not 
explicitly include a “principle of Thayerian deference” clause does not 
settle the question whether the full communicative content of the 
Constitution includes a principle of deference.  That principle might arise 
from implication or some form of contextual enrichment.208  In the 
discussion that follows, I am distinguishing between “implication,” by 
which I mean logical implication, on the one hand, and “implicature,”209 
“impliciture,”210 and “presupposition”211 (forms of contextual enrichment), 
on the other.212  Consider each of these possibilities in turn. 
b.  Thayerian Deference Is Not Logically Implied by the Constitutional Text 
If Thayerian deference were logically implied by the constitutional text, 
then it would be possible to produce a valid deductive syllogism with 
premises derived from the semantic content of the text.  No such syllogism 
is available.  Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how one would even begin 
building such a syllogism, since neither the concept of deference nor the 
concept of underdetermination (or equivalents of these ideas) appears 
anywhere in the text.  But if these concepts do not appear in the semantic 
content of the text, then how can the text provide premises that will yield a 
conclusion with these concepts?  Of course, the immediately prior sentence 
was a rhetorical question, reflecting the difficulty of proving a negative.  
But the burden of persuasion on this issue rests with those who assert that 
Thayerian deference is a logical implication of the constitutional text, and 
the burden is heavy because it can only be met with a valid logical 
deduction from the semantic content of the text. 
There is a logical argument about the text that leads to a conclusion about 
Thayerian deference.  Informally, that argument begins with the idea that in 
 
 208. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 209. See Wayne Davis, Implicature, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Sept. 22, 2010), 
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cases of constitutional underdetermination, the text does not logically entail 
the unconstitutionality of statutes or acts that fall within the zone of 
underdetermination.  This follows from the meaning of 
“underdetermination”; a provision of the constitution is underdeterminate 
with respect to the constitutionality of a statute or act if, and only if, the 
content of the provision neither clearly validates nor clearly invalidates the 
statute or act.  Precisely because of this logical consequence of 
constitutional underdeterminacy, it would be fallacious to argue that in the 
construction zone, courts are logically required to find any statute not 
clearly constitutional to be unconstitutional.  But an argument that courts 
must find that any statute that is in the construction zone is constitutional 
would suffer from the same logical fallacy.  It follows from the very 
meaning of underdeterminacy that neither result is logically required.  Put 
another way, the point of this paragraph is that any argument that deference 
is required in cases of constitutional underdeterminacy conflates a 
determinate “no” with an underdeterminate “maybe.”213 
Of course, the advocates of a principle of Thayerian deference are not 
arguing for the conclusion that cases of constitutional underdeterminacy are 
actually cases of determinate constitutionality.  Indeed, stated in this way, it 
is apparent that such argument would involve a logical contradiction—the 
same provision would be both underdeterminate and determinate.  Instead, 
they are arguing that underdeterminacy requires deference.  But this 
clarification regarding the nature of their conclusion makes the difficulty of 
their task clear:  the concept of deference is not found in the text, and the 
advocates of Thayerian deference have yet to make a plausible argument 
that deference is logically entailed by anything that can be found in the 
semantic content of the text. 
 
 213. Gary Lawson suggests that constitutional burdens of persuasion are logically implied 
by the constitutional text. See Lawson, supra note 190, at 1235.  Full consideration of his 
argument is beyond the scope of this Article.  Lawson argues, “The proposition that he who 
asserts must prove is a basic principle of rational thinking, not a normative theory of 
governance.” Id.  Let us call the default rule that results from this argument the “asserter-
must-prove rule.” 
  There are two difficulties with this position.  First, the burden of proof consists of 
both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion.  For example, the extent of 
federal power under the Commerce Clause might arise in an action by the federal 
government to enjoin a conflicting state law.  Suppose that the Commerce Clause is vague, 
and therefore under the asserter-must-prove rule, the Commerce Clause would not extend to 
the area in the construction zone.  But the same issue might arise if a state brought suit to 
enjoin the federal statute.  Now the state has the burden of production, and the asserter-must-
prove rule would require a court to find that federal power did exist within the construction 
zone.  Of course, Lawson’s own default rule does not operate this way, but it is precisely for 
that reason that Lawson’s default rule cannot be shown to be logically entailed by the 
constitutional text and “a basic principle of rational thinking.” 
  Second, and perhaps more importantly, unless vagueness is epistemic, see supra note 
153, the argument that burdens of production and persuasion are appropriate tools for the 
resolution of vagueness commits a category mistake.  If the text is nonepistemically vague, 
burdens of proof are beside the point.  A full discussion of the question whether vagueness is 
epistemic is outside the scope of this Article, but on the surface the claim that every 
seemingly vague legal text actually provides a precise bright-line rule is implausible. 
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Lawson and Paulsen may believe that they have demonstrated that their 
default rules are logically implied by the text.  The following passage from 
Paulsen is suggestive:  “If the Constitution’s text supplies no rule or 
standard governing the issue in question, the issue defaults to some other 
source of law or the designated authority of some decisionmaker who 
otherwise possesses policy discretion with respect to that issue.”214  
Paulsen’s argument rests on the assumption that the constitutional text 
“supplies no rule or standard governing the issue in question.”  That 
assumption holds when the constitutional text is silent with respect to the 
issue, but that is not the case when the text is vague, irreducibly ambiguous, 
or underdeterminate in some other way.  In those cases, the text does speak 
to the issue, but does not (by itself) determine the result.  In Paulsen’s own 
terms, it is not the case that there is “no rule or standard.”  There is a rule or 
standard, the application of which requires further construction.  So 
Paulsen’s argument fails at the first step.  But even if this step in Paulsen’s 
argument worked, there is another problem.  The conclusion that “the issue 
defaults to some other source of law” does not logically follow from the 
absence of a rule or standard.  This default rule is not a logical consequence 
of the fact that a given provision is underdeterminate—some additional 
premise would be required and no such premise is found in the text itself. 
At this point, some readers may object that my discussion of 
“implication” has been too narrow, focusing solely on logical implication 
and excluding arguments based on informal inferences from text and 
context.  This narrow focus has resulted in arguments that may strike these 
readers as “logic chopping”—the identification of formal logical flaws at 
the expense of a more holistic understanding of how texts can mean more 
than they say.  On the one hand, such objections are well taken:  in the next 
section we will consider a contextualist approach to communicative content 
that explicitly allows for inferences that fall far short of logical deduction.  
But on the other hand, these objections are misplaced:  the point of this 
subsection is simply that Thayerian deference cannot be derived as a matter 
of logical implication from the text—no more than that, but also no less. 
c.  Thayerian Deference Does Not Result from Contextual Enrichment of 
the Semantic Content of the Text 
Thayerian deference is not explicit in the text, nor is it logically implied 
by the text.  That leaves one final possible interpretive move:  one could 
argue that a principle of Thayerian deference arises from contextual 
enrichment of the text, by implicature, impliciture, or presupposition.  Let 
us put the technical differences between these forms of contextual 
enrichment to the side.  The basic idea of contextual enrichment is that 
given the publicly available context of constitutional communication, the 
text conveys communicative content that is unstated, because, for example, 
the meaningfulness or sensibility of the text assumes the additional content. 
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There are a variety of reasons for rejecting the claim that Thayerian 
deference is part of the full communicative content of the constitutional 
text, once contextual enrichment is taken into account.  The discussion that 
follows provides some of these reasons. 
i.  The Baselines Problem:  The Presumption Could Run in Multiple Ways 
The first and most fundamental difficulty for the claim that Thayerian 
deference was communicated via contextual enrichment concerns baselines.  
There are multiple possible baselines that could supply the presumption that 
operates when the constitutional text is underdeterminate.  Consider the 
following possibilities: 
 Presumption of constitutionality:  Presume that statutes or executive 
actions are valid when the constitutional text is vague, irreducibly 
ambiguous, or otherwise underdeterminate:  defer to democratically 
elected officials or their agents. 
 Presumption of liberty:  Presume that the actions of individuals are 
lawful when the constitutional text is vague, irreducibly ambiguous, 
or otherwise underdeterminate:  defer to individual liberty. 
 Presumption of judicial authority:  Presume that the judicial officials 
are empowered to engage in constitutional constructions with respect 
to the legal content of the Constitution when the constitutional text is 
vague, irreducibly ambiguous, or otherwise underdeterminate:  do not 
defer. 
Of course, there are other possibilities, including combinations of the three 
principles listed above, with different domains of application for each.  
Each of these presumptions is consistent with constitutional 
underdeterminacy.  Each assumes a different baseline (democratic 
decisionmaking, liberty, or judicial authority). 
The defender of Originalist Thayerianism might try to argue that 
something about the publicly available context of constitutional 
communication would have implicitly communicated the presumption of 
constitutionality.  So far as I am aware, no one has attempted to supply this 
argument, and it seems clear that any such attempt will face a substantial 
difficulty:  the argument must show that, for constitutional communication, 
the Framers of each provision would have been able to rely on an audience 
who would have grasped the unstated presumption based on the publicly 
available context.  Because multiple baselines are consistent with the text, 
this seems extraordinarily unlikely. 
Consider the alternatives to the Originalist Thayerian account of 
baselines that were advanced by St. George Tucker in his 1803 version of 
Blackstone’s Commentaries: 
All the powers of the federal government being either expressly 
enumerated, or necessary and proper to the execution of some enumerated 
power; and it being one of the rules of construction which sound reason 
has adopted; that, as exception strengthens the force of a law in cases not 
excepted, so enumeration weakens it, in cases not enumerated; it follows, 
2013]  CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 521 
as a regular consequence, that every power which concerns the right of the 
citizen, must be construed strictly, where it may operate to infringe or 
impair his liberty; and liberally, and for his benefit, where it may operate 
to his security and happiness, the avowed object of the constitution:  and, 
in like manner, every power which has been carved out of the states, who, 
at the time of entering into the confederacy, were in full possession of all 
the rights of sovereignty, is in like manner to be construed strictly, 
wherever a different construction might derogate from the rights and 
powers, which by the latter of these articles, are expressly acknowledged 
to be reserved to them respectively.215 
This passage strongly suggests that the context of constitutional 
communication did not convey an unambiguous implicit message that 
courts are to defer when the text is not clear—indeed, Tucker’s reading is to 
the contrary.  And this passage illustrates the more general difficulty for 
Originalist Thayerians:  a presumption of constitutionality is only one of 
several possible alternative understandings of the relevant baseline. 
Of course, arguments of political morality can be advanced for each of 
the competing baselines.  One could argue (1) for the presumption of 
constitutionality on the basis of popular sovereignty, (2) for the 
presumption of liberty based on a classical liberal (or contractarian) theory 
of justice, or (3) for the presumption of judicial authority based on an 
argument for the institutional competence of the courts.  But these are 
normative arguments about the best construction and not linguistic 
arguments about communicative content.  Putting this point just a bit 
differently, the presumption of constitutionality posited by Originalist 
Thayerianism requires a normative justification, and this fact strongly 
suggests that a principle of Thayerian deference is a construction and not an 
interpretation of the constitutional text. 
ii.  The Problem of Underdeterminate Deference:  Constitutional Conflict 
Between and Among Legislators and Executives 
There is a second problem with any attempt to argue that there are no 
construction zones because Thayerian deference was implicitly 
communicated by the constitutional text:  deference to democratic 
institutions produces indeterminate results when the constitutional question 
at issue involves a clash between two or more institutions that are 
democratically constituted. 
This problem is clearest with respect to the separation of powers.  Both 
the president and Congress are democratically elected.  The Constitution 
confers executive power on the president and enumerated legislative powers 
on the Congress, but these categories are almost certainly vague at the 
edges:  a presidential command denominated as an “executive order” might 
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be neither clearly executive nor clearly legislative in nature.216  When 
Congress and the president clash in the penumbral zone between the cores 
of their respective powers, the judicial branch cannot defer to both—it must 
pick one or the other. 
Similar problems can occur when a case involving Congress’s 
enumerated powers involves a direct conflict between the federal legislature 
and the legislatures of one or more of the several states.  The courts may be 
required to determine a federalism case involving the penumbra of 
Congress’s power.  If the courts defer to Congress, then they will override 
the democratically elected state legislature, but if the courts defer to the 
states, then the courts will override Congress. 
These cases demonstrate that the principle of deference to democratic 
institutions is itself underdeterminate, and hence that this principle cannot 
always be applied without constitutional construction.  But if this is the 
case, then it follows that with respect to federalism and separation of 
powers, there are substantial construction zones—even if the 
communicative content of the constitutional text included a principle of 
democratic deference. 
iii.  The Ninth Amendment Problem:  The Semantic Content of the Ninth 
Amendment Is Inconsistent with the Argument That Context Requires 
Global Thayerian Deference 
There is a third problem with the attempt to derive Thayerian deference 
from the communicative content of the constitutional text.  We have already 
seen that a principle of deference to democratic institutions is 
underdeterminate when applied to a conflict between democratic 
institutions (at the federal level or between the federal and state 
governments).  But there is another equally serious problem with applying a 
principle of deference in cases involving clashes between democratic 
institutions and individuals.  The Ninth Amendment provides, “The 
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to 
deny or disparage others retained by the people.”217  As discussed above,218 
the Ninth Amendment arguably creates an implicature to the effect that 
there are retained rights.219  One way of understanding Originalist 
Thayerianism as applied to individual rights cases is that it denies 
enforcement to rights outside the undisputed core of the enumerated rights.  
But, understood in this way, this principle of deference seems to use 
enumeration as a premise for a construction that disparages retained rights 
on the basis of enumeration—the very kind of construction that the Ninth 
Amendment forbids.  Even if one believes that the rights implicated by the 
Ninth Amendment should not be judicially enforced, it is difficult to deny 
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that Originalist Thayerianism cannot be defended as a constitutional 
interpretation if it is in tension with the explicit and implicit content of the 
Ninth Amendment.  Of course, that would leave the door open to Thayerian 
deference as a principle of constitutional construction—the final point in 
this Part. 
4.  Qualification:  Thayerian Deference As Construction Could Survive the 
Case Against Thayerian Deference As Interpretation 
Having rehearsed a slew of arguments against Originalist Thayerianism 
as an interpretation of the explicit or implicit content of the constitutional 
text, I want to emphasize the limit of these arguments.  I have not argued 
against a principle of deference on the basis of a constitutional 
construction—but I have not endorsed such a principle either.  For the 
purposes of this Article, the Originalist Thayerianism is confronted because 
it has been argued that a principle of deference or a presumption of 
constitutionality eliminates the need for construction or the existence of the 
construction zone.  The point of the arguments here is that Originalist 
Thayerianism is best understood as a distinctive approach to constitutional 
construction and a way of proceeding in the construction zone. 
*  *  * 
After this lengthy discussion of Originalist Thayerianism, it may be wise 
to pull back from the trees and look at the forest.  The general point of this 
subsection is to argue that there is a construction zone and there are good 
reasons to believe it is substantial.  The Constitution contains a variety of 
provisions that are both general and vague, thus creating underdeterminacy.  
That fact does not entail the conclusion that individual judges have 
discretion to make decisions based on their own views of political morality.  
Work in the construction zone can be done by canons of construction or 
default rules that constrain judicial discretion.  Or it could be done by direct 
resort to principle and policy.  And there are many other alternatives:  
construction guided by original methods, common law methods of 
construction, construction guided by the functions of each constitutional 
provision, and so forth.  Disagreements about the best approach to 
constitutional construction are important, and one of the most significant 
payoffs of the interpretation-construction distinction is that it enables us to 
precisely understand such disputes. 
D.  The Contestability of the Claim That the 
Construction Zone Is Ineliminable 
Constitutional construction is ubiquitous.  Given that “construction” 
refers to the process of determining legal effect, this claim is true because 
officials act in ways that give the Constitution legal effect.  No one should 
contest this claim—once they understand what it means.  The existence of 
the construction zone, on the other hand, is contestable.  We have examined 
two different strategies for minimizing or eliminating the construction zone.  
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Original Methods Originalism argues that the original methods of 
constitutional construction provide determinate content to constitutional 
provisions that, on their surface, seem vague or underdeterminate in some 
other way.  Originalist Thayerianism argues that the constitutional text 
contains an unstated default rule of deference to democratic institutions.  I 
have argued here that neither strategy is likely to succeed, but my 
arguments, like those of the proponents of these theories, rely on a variety 
of contestable empirical claims.  For this reason, there is no knockdown 
argument for the proposition that the construction zone is ineliminable.  
Instead, we have examined a series of considerations that make the 
ineliminability claim plausible and well supported and a variety of 
arguments that suggest that Original Methods Originalism and Originalist 
Thayerianism are unlikely to succeed if they are viewed as theories of 
constitutional interpretation.  That leaves open the possibility that these 
theories might be recast as prescriptions for constitutional construction.  In 
that form, both Original Methods Originalism and Originalist Thayerianism 
are more plausible.  The ultimate question whether these theories should be 
affirmed as theories of constitutional construction depends on normative 
issues—the resolution of which is beyond the scope of this Article. 
V.  THE RELATIONSHIP OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONSTRUCTION TO ORIGINALISM 
The two central claims of this Article are that construction is 
ubiquitous220 and that the construction zone is ineliminable.221  If those 
claims are true, what are the implications for originalism?  Can originalist 
constitutional theory embrace the existence of the construction zone and 
remain true to its core principles?  Or does the New Originalism become a 
form of living constitutionalism? 
Thomas Colby has raised these questions in a thoughtful way in his lucid 
article, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism.222  He offers a helpful 
distinction between “constraint” and “restraint”: 
[A]lthough originalism in its New incarnation no longer emphasizes 
judicial restraint—in the sense of deference to legislative majorities—it 
continues to a substantial degree to emphasize judicial constraint—in the 
sense of promising to narrow the discretion of judges.  New Originalists 
believe that the courts should sometimes be quite active in preserving (or 
restoring) the original constitutional meaning, but they do not believe that 
the courts are unconstrained in that activism.  They are constrained by 
their obligation to remain faithful to the original meaning.223 
Let us adopt and refine Colby’s distinction, stipulating the following 
definitions: 
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 “Constitutional constraint” is a function of (1) the version of the 
Constraint Principle that governs constitutional practice, and (2) the 
extent to which the communicative content of the constitutional text 
determines (or underdetermines) legal effect.  “Constitutional 
freedom” is the stipulated antonym. 
 “Judicial restraint” occurs when judges do not exercise the power of 
judicial review to invalidate actions taken by the political branches 
(executive and judicial officials).  “Judicial engagement” is the 
stipulated antonym.224 
Given these stipulated definitions, we can say a bit more about the nature 
of both constraint and restraint.  Constitutional constraint is a complex 
scalar (a matter of degree along more than one dimension).  Perfect 
constitutional constraint exists if the constitutional text (a) fully determines 
all constitutional effects, and (b) officials are bound by the version of the 
Constraint Principle that completes correspondence between the 
communicative content of the constitutional text and the legal content of 
constitutional doctrine.  Perfect constitutional freedom would exist if 
(a) officials completely rejected the principle of constitutional restraint, or 
(b) the communicative content of the constitutional text were radically 
indeterminate, or (c) both (a) and (b) were true.  There are a variety of 
intermediate possibilities, corresponding to different configurations of 
underdeterminacy and various versions of the Constraint Principle.  
Constitutional constraint is a function of both interpretation and 
construction. 
Judicial restraint is also a complex scalar.  At one extreme would be a 
principle of total judicial deference—judges would never exercise the 
power of judicial review.  More restraint would be provided by Thayerian 
Originalism, which requires judges to defer to the political branches unless 
the communicative content of the constitutional text clearly requires 
otherwise.  Rational basis review provides another mechanism of 
deference—judges defer to the political branches so long as there is a 
rational basis for the political actor to believe that their action complies 
with the judicially determined meaning of the constitutional text.  Strong 
judicial engagement would require judges to exercise the power of judicial 
review whenever a judge believed that the constitutional construction 
corresponding to the best interpretation of the text invalidates action by a 
political official or institution.  Again, there are many other variations.  
Judicial restraint is a function of constitutional construction. 
In other words, both constitutional constraint and judicial restraint are 
matters of degree and both have a complex structure.  The theoretical space 
(the possible combinations of various views of constraint and restraint) is 
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therefore large and multidimensional.  Originalism narrows the range of 
possibilities in two ways.  First, the Fixation Thesis narrows the range of 
underdeterminacy of meaning.  Living constitutionalists might be free to 
pick and choose between various “meanings” that morph to conform to 
changing circumstances and values:  this creates a kind of irreducible meta-
ambiguity.  But originalists are committed to the view that the only relevant 
meanings are fixed by linguistic facts at the time each provision of the 
Constitution is framed and ratified.  Second, the Constraint Principle (in any 
plausible version) limits the range of possible constructions to those that are 
consistent with the constitutional text (at a minimum) or to constructions 
that are required by the text (at a maximum).  Nonoriginalists can reject the 
Constraint Principle; for example the Multiple Modalities Model (depicted 
above)225 allows for constitutional constructions that are inconsistent with 
the communicative content of the text, although living constitutionalists 
may try to characterize their results as consistent with what they call the 
“meaning”:  the crucial conceptual point is that nonoriginalists who conflate 
interpretation with construction use “meaning” in a way that conflates 
communicative content with legal content and legal effect. 
Originalists differ among themselves about both constraint and restraint.  
Consider constitutional constraint.  Some originalists believe that the 
construction zone is both real and substantial:  I have argued for that 
position in this Article.  But other originalists believe that the construction 
zone is small or nonexistent:  McGinnis and Rappaport argue that the 
original methods of constitutional interpretation and construction reduce or 
eliminate constitutional underdeterminacy.226  And there is a similar range 
of opinion with respect to constraint.  The family of originalist theories 
includes a variety of views about constitutional construction, ranging from 
Originalist Thayerianism (or the default rule of deference) reconstructed on 
the basis of work by Lawson227 and Paulsen228 to Balkin’s Living 
Originalism.229 
These differences suggest questions about the role of “originalism” as the 
name of a coherent family of theories.  What is the utility of the label 
“originalist” given this divergence?  Can contemporary originalism be 
distinguished from its rival, living constitutionalism?  Is the New 
Originalism really originalist at all? 
Before addressing these questions, we might observe that they are not 
questions about the substance of constitutionalist theory.  Rather than 
disputing labels and terminology, we might address the merits of the claims 
made by originalists and living constitutionalists.  We could ask whether 
the Fixation Thesis is true or whether the Constraint Principle is warranted.  
We could engage in substantive discussion about the possible vagueness or 
ambiguity of particular constitutional provisions.  We could investigate the 
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merits of various versions of the Constraint Principle.  We could examine 
the rationales of competing views about the justifications for different 
accounts of judicial restraint and engagement.  And we could apply the 
results of these investigations to particular constitutional controversies.  
That is, we can do the work of constitutional theory.  That enterprise seems 
more likely to produce valuable contributions to constitutional practice and 
to our understanding of the relationships between constitutional theory, 
jurisprudence, political philosophy, and other disciplines, than the 
alternative—disputing about the meaning of the words and phrases 
“originalism,” “nonoriginalism,” and “living constitutionalism.” 
Colby’s The Sacrifice of the New Originalism is wonderfully 
illuminating, but one might question his characterization of theoretical 
progress as “sacrifice.”  It is true that New Originalists characteristically 
argue for the existence of a significant construction zone; this entails that 
New Originalists believe that constitutional constraint is less than perfect.  
But the central theoretical contributions of the New Originalism, the turn to 
public meaning and the recognition of the interpretation-construction 
distinction do not end debates about constitutional constraint and judicial 
restraint.  Instead, these moves have resulted in a vigorous exchange among 
originalists about various mechanisms of constraint and restraint.  Thus, 
McGinnis and Rappaport have provoked a discussion of the relationship 
between public meaning and original methods of interpretation and 
construction.  Lawson and Paulsen have suggested approaches to 
constitutional construction that can reconcile the existence of the 
construction zone with a restrained conception of the judicial role.  These 
moves clarify and advance debates in constitutional theory.  One might 
characterize this dynamic as an achievement of the New Originalism and 
not a sacrifice. 
A different sort of concern is expressed by critics of the New Originalism 
who object to the use of the term “originalism” to refer to the views of 
theorists like Whittington, Barnett, and Balkin.  A recent example is 
provided by Judicial Review, Constitutional Interpretation, and the 
Democratic Dilemma:  Proposing a “Controlled Activism” Alternative by 
Martin Redish and Matthew Arnould.230  They write: 
Recall that originalism grew out of an understandable desire to cabin the 
interpretive discretion of unrepresentative, unaccountable judges who, 
under the guise of “interpreting” the counter-majoritarian Constitution, 
were all too often trumping the democratic process by superimposing 
their own social policy choices on the majoritarian political process.  The 
means for restraining modern judicial review contemplated by originalist 
theory was to confine the interpretive options open to modern judges to 
the understandings of those alive at the time of the framing and 
ratification of the relevant constitutional provision.  Yet, contrary to this 
asserted goal, the originalist construction school openly concedes the 
widespread impossibility of successfully performing the archaeological 
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and translational task that is the sine qua non of true originalist analysis.  
It replaces it with an indeterminate mode of “construction” that permits 
the very results that originalism was designed to avoid—namely, the 
unrestrained judicial trumping of democratically authorized decision 
making and the implementation of textual understandings of which those 
alive at the time of ratification would have been totally unaware.  This 
may well be an appropriate means of constitutional construction for those 
of us who have long categorically rejected the entire originalist endeavor 
as hopeless and often manipulative.  But it is surely Orwellian to describe 
this theory as “originalist” in any meaningful sense of that term.231 
This argument simply fails to take into account both the complex history of 
originalism and the current literature.  There is a widely used sense of the 
term “originalist” that meaningfully includes both Old and New 
Originalisms and that embraces both the champions and opponents of 
existence of a construction zone.232  Almost every version of originalist 
constitutional theory incorporates the Fixation Thesis and the Constraint 
Principle:  originalism is meaningfully used to refer to the family of 
originalist theories that embrace these two ideas. 
Redish and Arnould’s assertion that originalism grew out of desire for 
constitutional constraint and judicial restraint233 may well be correct, but 
this does not entail their assumption that constraint and restraint are 
constitutive of originalism itself.  Rather, their argument is based on a 
serious conceptual error, conflating the motivation for a theory with the 
content of the theory.  Sometimes, general legal theories have consequences 
that are entirely congenial to those who first developed the theories, but 
(unsurprisingly) general theories can be a mixed bag, achieving only part of 
the ambitions of those who got the theories off the ground. 
The legitimacy of using the term “originalism” to label a theoretical 
position must be assessed with reference to an account of the content of 
originalism.  The interpretation-construction distinction is consistent with 
that content, as originalism was first defined by Brest, as it developed into 
Public Meaning Originalism in the 1980s, and as it has evolved into the 
New Originalism.234  Recall that originalism was a term introduced by Paul 
Brest and defined by him to refer to “the familiar approach to constitutional 
adjudication that accords binding authority to the text of the Constitution or 
the intentions of its adopters”235—a definition that is fully consistent with 
the understanding of originalism as a family of constitutional theories that 
embraces the Fixation Thesis and the Constraint Principle.  The move to 
public meaning began in the mid-1980s, shortly after originalism entered 
the constitutional vocabulary.  The focus on public meanings led directly to 
 
 231. Id. at 1509 (emphasis added). 
 232. Characterizing “originalism” in terms of the Fixation Thesis and Constraint Principle 
is not idiosyncratic. See supra note 7 (collecting uses of the distinction in contemporary 
constitutional theory). 
 233. For discussion of constitutional constraint and judicial restraint, see supra notes 
222–21 and accompanying text. 
 234. For the relevant history, see supra Part I.A. 
 235. Brest, The Misconceived Quest, supra note 14, at 204. 
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appreciation that the original meaning of some constitutional provisions 
was vague (or underdeterminate in some other way), and that appreciation 
led directly to the interpretation-construction distinction and the associated 
idea of a construction zone.  These are developments within originalist 
theory. 
Moreover, the interpretation-construction distinction is consistent with 
every version of originalism, because acceptance of the distinction follows 
from recognition of the difference between meaning and effect—something 
that every originalist can and should embrace.  Redish and Arnould’s 
assumption that construction is inherently indeterminate (and hence that it 
entails “unrestrained judicial trumping of democratically authorized 
decision making”) is simply false; for example, Originalist Thayerianism is 
a theory of constitutional construction that explicitly rejects these 
assumptions.  Moreover, it is far from evident that the Constraint Principle 
is toothless, even with respect to broad and abstract provisions like the 
Commerce Clause; at least on some originalist accounts, the original 
meaning of interstate commerce would require a substantial revision of 
current doctrine.236  The use of the uncharitable epithet “Orwellian”237 
seems especially inappropriate, given that New Originalists who argue for 
the existence of a substantial construction zone have been remarkably 
candid about the implications of this move.238 
 
 236. See generally Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 
U. CHI. L. REV. 101 (2001). 
 237. I take it that the normative significance of the term “Orwellian” is clear.  The 
reference is to George Orwell’s novel, Nineteen Eighty-Four, with its fictitious language 
“Newspeak” and the Newspeak word “doublethink.”  Here is the famous passage: 
The keyword here is blackwhite.  Like so many Newspeak words, this word has 
two mutually contradictory meanings.  Applied to an opponent, it means the habit 
of impudently claiming that black is white, in contradiction of the plain facts.  
Applied to a Party member, it means a loyal willingness to say that black is white 
when Party discipline demands this.  But it means also the ability to believe that 
black is white, and more, to know that black is white, and to forget that one has 
ever believed the contrary.  This demands a continuous alteration of the past, made 
possible by the system of thought which really embraces all the rest, and which is 
known in Newspeak as doublethink . . . .  Doublethink means the power of holding 
two contradictory beliefs in one’s mind simultaneously, and accepting both of 
them. 
GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 218–20 (1949).  “Orwellian” implies 
manipulation and deception—charges that should not be lightly made in academic discourse 
and that are completely unwarranted in the case of originalist theorizing about the 
interpretation-construction distinction. 
 238. Thomas Colby’s analysis of an argument similar to Arnould and Redish’s 
“Orwellianism” charge is helpful: 
One might be tempted to speculate that what is really going on here is not that 
originalism has fundamentally changed, but rather, that several former 
nonoriginalists have jumped on the originalism bandwagon and have attempted to 
co-opt the “originalist” label for their own decidedly nonoriginalist purposes.  In 
other words, perhaps the New Originalism has not so much replaced the Old 
Originalism as it has cynically stolen its limelight.  But that is not so.  It is true that 
a few of the most vocal self-identified New Originalists have pushed the theory 
further in the direction of admitted flexibility than most other self-proclaimed 
originalists would be comfortable acknowledging.  But it is also true that (almost) 
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Finally, Redish and Arnould are simply mistaken when they assert, “the 
originalist construction school openly concedes the widespread 
impossibility of successfully performing the archaeological and 
translational task that is the sine qua non of true originalist analysis.”239  
New Originalists do not contend that interpretation (understood as the 
discovery of communicative content) can accurately be characterized as 
subject to “widespread impossibility.”  Quite the opposite, they insist that 
the discovery of original meaning is always possible in theory and with 
respect to many or most of the provisions of the Constitution, not only 
possible but actually accomplished in fact.  Many New Originalists believe 
that there are some provisions for which confidence about original meaning 
will require additional research. 
As I understand the position of the New Originalists (and I count myself 
as among them), most of the provisions of the Constitution are structural 
and have clear original meanings:  the detailed plan for the national 
government including the various rules constituting the Congress, 
presidency, and the judicial branch have discernable original meanings and 
much of that plan is substantially determinate.  Many of the vague 
provisions (including important individual rights provisions) create 
construction zones, but this is because the discernable original meaning 
underdetermines some constitutional questions. 
Some originalists may believe that there are a few provisions of the 
constitution where the original meaning is highly contestable (and perhaps 
where the available evidence is not fully adequate to resolve the 
controversies clearly); the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment might be such a provision.240  But so far as I know, 
there is no originalist who believes that this phenomenon is “widespread” or 
that recovery of original meaning in general is “impossible.”  Redish and 
Arnould provide no examples of New Originalists embracing their notion of 
“widespread impossibility” and the paragraph in which this assertion 
appears does not include a single citation.241  Their earlier discussion of 
what they call “originalist construction”242 does include citations to my 
work243 and to Keith Whittington.244  But none of the cited passages or 
 
no one is an Old Originalist anymore.  It is now nearly impossible to find an 
originalist who has not explicitly or implicitly endorsed at least some of the 
theoretical moves discussed in Part I of this Article. 
Colby, supra note 222, at 748. 
 239. Redish & Arnould, supra note 9, at 1509. 
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pages includes the “widespread impossibility” thesis that Redish and 
Arnould attribute to New Originalists.  In my own case, I am fairly sure that 
I have never advanced such a thesis. 
Redish and Arnould seem to have conflated the New Originalist 
contention that there are significant constructions zones or 
underdeterminacy with the radically different thesis that the constitutional 
text is profoundly indeterminate.  Many New Originalists do believe that 
there are significant constitutional provisions for which the discoverable 
original meaning is vague, and that this vagueness creates a construction 
zone.  But characterizing this position as equivalent to the “widespread 
impossibility” thesis is simply not accurate. 
Peter Smith advances a related argument in How Different Are 
Originalism and Non-originalism?245  Smith argues that the New 
Originalism and its embrace of constitutional construction collapses or blurs 
the distinction between originalism and nonoriginalism.  The claim is 
peculiar, since one would ordinarily think that the use of negative prefix 
“non” would distinguish originalism and nonoriginalism into two mutually 
exclusive categories.  The key to this mystery is found in Smith’s definition 
of nonoriginalism. 
For present purposes, however, I use Mitchell Berman’s description of 
non-originalism as the “thesis that facts that occur after ratification or 
amendment can properly bear—constitutively, not just evidentially—on 
how courts should interpret the Constitution . . . .”  Notwithstanding the 
caricature of non-originalism that many originalists have offered, most 
non-originalists—or at least most scholars or judges who do not readily 
identify as originalists—believe that the original meaning is highly 
relevant and often dispositive.  Few, if any, non-originalists would claim, 
for example, that a thirty-year-old person is eligible to be President, or 
that the Republican Form of Government Clause could plausibly be read 
to guarantee the modern Republican Party a constitutional monopoly on 
power at the state level.  In other words, most non-originalists treat the 
original meaning as the starting point for any interpretive inquiry, but are 
willing to look elsewhere—to history, precedent, structure, and policy, to 
name a few of Phillip [sic] Bobbitt’s famous modalities of constitutional 
argument to construct constitutional meaning when the text is vague or 
indeterminate. 
 If this is a fair description of non-originalism, then if nothing else it 
should be clear that new originalism is not very different from non-
originalism in practice.  For both, the original meaning generally provides 
the starting point for any act of constitutional interpretation, but because 
of the level of generality at which much of the constitutional text is 
expressed, it rarely alone provides the conclusion.  For both, the types of 
constitutional questions that are most likely to be litigated—those for 
which the relevant constitutional text is capacious and abstract—require 
tools of judicial decisionmaking beyond mere reference to the original 
 
 244. Id. at 1508 n.94. 
 245. Peter J. Smith, How Different Are Originalism and Non-originalism?, 62 HASTINGS 
L.J. 707, 722–24 (2011). 
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meaning of the text.  And for both, the abstractness of the constitutional 
text and the indeterminacy inherent in the process of construction mean 
that there can be no perfectly predictable template for constitutional 
decisionmaking and thus, that there is a range of plausible and defensible 
results.246 
To the extent that Smith relies on Berman’s conception of the line between 
originalism and nonoriginalism, his argument is problematic. 
The full context of the definition that Smith quotes from Berman is as 
follows: 
It follows, of course, that Originalism’s opponents need merely deny that 
courts must interpret the Constitution in accordance with its original 
meaning, even when that meaning is discoverable.  Such a position is 
commonly called, seemingly interchangeably, both “non-originalism” and 
“living constitutionalism.”  For reasons set out in the margin, however, 
the terms are best viewed as nonidentical.  The former is more apt and is 
the one I will adopt.  Non-originalism, in other words, is the thesis that 
facts that occur after ratification or amendment can properly bear—
constitutively, not just evidentially—on how courts should interpret the 
Constitution (even when the original meaning is sufficiently clear).  It 
does not hold that original meaning, when discoverable, should be 
irrelevant to judicial interpretation, or even that its relevance should be 
slight.  Non-originalism is simply the denial of strong originalism; it is 
not the denial of all forms of originalism.247 
Berman defines nonoriginalism as consistent with some forms of 
originalism.  It simply follows as a matter of definition from Berman’s 
stipulation that any form of originalism not categorized by Berman as 
“strong” is also a form of nonoriginalism, but it is surely confusing to create 
a category of “nonoriginalist originalism.” 
What then is “strong originalism”?  Here is Berman’s explanation: 
Strong originalism, as I will use the term, comprises two distinct subsets.  
Probably the most immediately recognizable originalist thesis holds that, 
whatever may be put forth as the proper focus of interpretive inquiry 
(framers’ intent, ratifiers’ understanding, or public meaning), that object 
should be the sole interpretive target or touchstone.  Call this subtype of 
strong originalism “exclusive originalism.”  It can be distinguished from a 
sibling view that is a shade less strong—viz., that interpreters must accord 
original meaning (or intent or understanding) lexical priority when 
interpreting the Constitution but may search for other forms of meaning 
(contemporary meaning, best meaning, etc.) when the original meaning 
cannot be ascertained with sufficient confidence.  Call this marginally 
more modest variant of strong originalism “lexical originalism.”248 
Berman’s definitions do not take into account the interpretation-
construction distinction, nor do they track theoretical discussions in 
 
 246. Id. at 722–24 (citing Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 
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 247. Berman, supra note 246, at 24. 
 248. Id. at 10. 
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contemporary originalist scholarship.  We can, however, reconstruct 
Berman’s definitions in light of the distinction between construction and 
interpretation. 
If Berman means that “strong originalism” is the view that original 
meaning (e.g., original public meaning, original intent, etc.) is the only 
object of interpretation in the sense specified by the interpretation-
construction distinction, then “strong originalism” names all the members 
of the originalist family that accept the interpretation-construction 
distinction and the Fixation Thesis.  Interpretation just is the activity that 
discovers “meaning” in the sense of communicative content; the Fixation 
Thesis is the claim that the communicative content of the constitutional text 
is fixed at the time each provision is framed and ratified—this is what the 
term “original” in “original meaning” represents.  If nonoriginalism denies 
this, then it truly is different from almost every form of originalism. 
But if Berman means that “strong originalism” is the view that original 
meaning is the only object of construction (again, in the sense of 
“construction” specified by the interpretation-construction distinction), then 
his claim would be nonsensical—since the stipulated definition of 
“construction” is that it is the activity of determining legal effect and not 
meaning (“communicative content”).  We could repair Berman’s definition 
in the following manner.  Berman could define “strong originalism” as the 
view that constitutional construction should be solely determined by 
original meaning.  Of course, that view would only be sensible if the 
communicative content of the constitutional text were sufficient to fully 
determine each and every constitutional controversy.  That is, this definition 
excludes any version of originalism that recognizes the existence of the 
construction zone.  We can clarify the relationship among contemporary 
constitutional theories further, by defining “living constitutionalism” as the 
view that legal effect is not fixed at the time each provision of the 
Constitution is framed and ratified. 
The resulting picture is depicted in Table 1, which relies on the 
distinction between “constraint” and “restraint” that is stipulated above.249  
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Berman’s categories “strong originalism” and “nonoriginalism” obscure 
the real issues that divide contemporary constitutional theories of 
interpretation and construction.  In a real sense, there are four active 
schools of thought: 
 Originalists who believe that the original meaning of the text is 
sufficient to decide every possible constitutional controversy.  
McGinnis and Rappaport adopt this position provisionally, although 
they allow for the theoretical possibility that there is a residual 
construction zone.  These theorists reject living constitutionalism. 
 Originalists who believe that the original meaning of the text 
underdetermines some constitutional issues, but adopt a theory of 
construction that creates judicial restraint in the resulting 
construction zone.  Originalist Thayerianism understood as a 
reconstruction of views advanced by Lawson and Paulsen falls into 
this category, although Paulsen seems to accept a subcategory of 
cases in which the text itself requires judicial engagement.  These 
theorists reject living constitutionalism as a judicial practice, 
although they might accept changing constitutional constructions 
adopted by the political branches. 
 Originalists who believe that the original meaning of the text 
underdetermines some constitutional issues, and adopt a theory of 
constitutional construction that allows for judicially enforceable 
constitutional doctrines to change over time. Balkin’s theory, the 
method of text and principle or Living Originalism is the clearest 
example of such a theory.  Randy Barnett’s Original Public Meaning 
Originalism may be a second example.  These theorists accept living 
constitutionalism as a judicial practice and also accept changing 
constitutional constructions adopted by the political branches.  James 
Ryan, who labels his theory New Textualism250 and does not 
embrace originalism as a label, also seems to fall into this group. 
 Nonoriginalists who believe that the contemporary and original 
meaning of the constitutional text is one of several factors that are 
relevant to constitutional construction, but who reject the idea that 
the content of constitutional doctrine and the decision of 
constitutional cases must always be consistent with the original 
meaning of the constitutional text.  Bobbitt’s Multiple Modalities 
view is the clearest example of this kind of theory.  These theorists 
fully embrace living constitutionalism by courts and other political 
institutions.251 
 
 250. See Ryan, supra note 148, at 1552–53. 
 251. Some living constitutionalists may object to the final category.  They might argue 
that almost all constitutional theorists accept the constraining force of the text when it is 
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constitutional settlement supports application of the clear text to the apportionment of the 
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case of the Equal Protection Clause, for example, moral considerations might trump original 
meaning—even if it could be shown that the original meaning of the clause could not 
support the contemporary reading that the clause requires legislation to conform to a general 
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Of course, this typology simplifies the landscape of constitutional theory—
as it is intended to do.  Nonetheless, it illuminates the real stakes in 
contemporary debates among constitutional theorists.  Much of the action in 
debates among contemporary originalists concerns the three positions 
represented by (1) McGinnis and Rappaport, (2) Lawson and Paulsen, and 
(3) Balkin and Barnett—the real stakes in these debates concern constraint 
and restraint.  The lines in debates among living constitutionalists are 
between those who accept the constraining force of the original meaning of 
the text (e.g., Balkin) and those who believe that original meaning is only 
one factor, to be balanced against others in constitutional construction (e.g., 
Bobbitt).  Debates between originalists and nonoriginalists likewise focus 
the arguments for and against the Constraint Principle. 
The picture in Table 1 is oversimplified because these alignments may 
shift depending on the nature of the constitutional issue at stake—some 
progressive constitutionalists may believe in Thayerianism when it comes 
to questions of national legislative power, separation of powers, checks and 
balances, and economic rights (Lochner v. New York252), but endorse 
judicial engagement for noneconomic individual liberties and equality 
rights:  these are hybrid views, adopting different theories of constitutional 
construction for different issues.  But in the context of examining the 
relationship between originalist constitutional theory and constitutional 
construction, the real point is that the interpretation construction distinction 
and the related idea of the construction zone enable us to see both the 
simplified picture and the complexities. 
CONCLUSION 
Constitutional theory cannot do without the interpretation-construction 
distinction.  It is difficult to understand what is at stake in contemporary 
debates about originalism and living constitutionalism without clearly 
distinguishing between the communicative content of the constitutional 
text, on the one hand, and the legal content of constitutional doctrine and 
constitutional decisions, on the other hand.  Once we have the 
interpretation-construction distinction in place, we can discuss the question 
whether there is a substantial construction zone.  And it is only if we 
recognize the existence of the construction zone, that we can clearly pose 
the question as to what should be done about the fact of constitutional 
underdetermination. 
This Article has argued for two claims:  (1) that constitutional 
construction is ubiquitous and (2) that the construction zone is ineliminable.  
Once the nature of the constitutional construction is understood, every 
constitutionalist theorist should accept that it is inevitable.  Constitutional 
construction just is the process by which we give effect to the constitutional 
 
principle of equality of persons.  From the fact that the Multiple Modalities approach 
sometimes supports compliance with the text, it does not follow that this approach adopts the 
Constraint Principle. 
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text and no constitutional theorist should deny that we do, in fact, devise 
constitutional doctrines and decide constitutional cases.  On the first claim 
then, the aim of this Article is to end the dispute over substance, although 
terminological differences may remain. 
On the second claim, things are more complicated.  The existence and 
substantiality of the construction zone is subject to dispute.  We have seen 
that there are powerful arguments for the conclusion that the 
communicative content of the constitutional text underdetermines the legal 
content of constitutional doctrine and the decision of constitutional cases.  
Some issues seem relatively settled; no one should dispute the claim that 
the language of some constitutional provisions seems vague or open 
textured and hence that there is (at least) a pro tanto reason for affirming the 
existence of the construction zone.  Nonetheless, the case for a substantial 
construction zone depends in part on the results of both originalist 
theorizing and originalist investigation of particular provisions of the 
Constitution—and this theorizing and these investigations are still 
underway.  On the second claim then, the aim of this Article is to move the 
debate forward by providing a detailed defense against claims that the 
construction zone does not exist.  Until, and unless, additional arguments 
are forthcoming, the case for the ineliminability of the construction zone 
stands. 
*  *  * 
One conclusion does seem clear.  The idea of constitutional construction 
is essential to progress in constitutional theory. 
 
